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TITLE IX AND SAME-GENDER SEXUAL HARASSMENT: 
SCHOOL DISTRICT LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES 
Karen L. Michaelis* 
INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court recently decided three important cases 
concerning sexual harassment. 1 This trilogy of cases is key to 
understanding the current judicial position regarding employer 
liability for sexual harassment involving co-workers of the 
same gender, institutional liability for the sexual misconduct of 
teachers with students, and school district liability for student 
to student sexual harassment. 
With Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 2 Gebser 
v. Lago Vista Independent School District, 3 and more recently 
Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, 4 the Supreme 
* Karen L. Michaelis, Ph.D. 1988, University of Wisconsin-Madison; J.D. 1989, 
University of Wisconsin-Madison. Dr. Michaelis is an Assistant Professor at Washing-
ton State University in the Department of Educational Leadership and Counseling 
Psychology. 
1. See Oncale v. Sundowner, 523 U.S. 75 (1998); Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. 
Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998); Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 119 S. Ct. 1661 
(1999). 
2. 523 U.S. 75 (1998). Joseph Oncale was repeatedly subjected to sexual taunts 
and mock sexual acts by his co-workers. Despite Oncale's complaints to his supervisor 
about the conditions in the workplace caused by his co-workers' acts, Oncale's supervi-
sors took no action to stop the harassment. Ultimately, Joseph Oncale quit his job be-
cause of the ongoing sexual harassment. 
3. 524 U.S. 274 (1998). A female high school student, Alida Gebser, had a sexual 
relationship with a male teacher. Gebser did not report the relationship to school offi-
cials, but when officials discovered the relationship, the teacher was fired. Contrary to 
federal regulations, the district did not have a "formal antiharassment policy" or an 
"official grievance procedure" at the time of the sexual relationship. I d. at 282. Gebser 
sued the district for damages under Title IX. 
4. 526 U.S. 629 (1999). LaShonda Davis alleged that the school district's delib-
erate indifference to her complaints of sexual harassment by a male student "created 
an intimidating, hostile, offensive, and abusive school environment," in violation of Ti-
tle IX of the Education Amendments of 1972. Id. at 1668. The Supreme Court held that 
there is a private cause of action for damages under Title IX for student to student 
sexual harassment, "but only where the funding recipient is deliberately indifferent to 
47 
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Court has begun the process of clarifying the various judicial 
approaches used to determine employer and institutional li-
ability for different forms of sexual harassment. Existing 
precedents indicate that courts are generally quite hesitant to 
hold school districts liable for hostile environment sexual har-
assment. And in the area of peer sexual harassment between 
students of the opposite sex, the result is the same. Courts con-
sistently hold that school districts will not be liable under the 
pre-Davis standard for harassment that occurs between private 
individuals who are not employed by the school district. 5 
Student victims of peer sexual harassment have tried sev-
eral approaches in their attempts to hold school districts mone-
tarily responsible for harm done by third party non-employees.6 
Virtually all of these cases have failed under a variety of legal 
theories. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc. 7 offers 
yet another approach in cases where individuals are subjected 
to sexual harassment by their co-workers of the same gender. 
But based on all the legal theories previously considered by 
various courts, Oncale does not appear to offer much assistance 
to students subjected to sexual harassment by another student 
of the same gender. Additionally, the effect of Oncale was that 
the standard of liability for sexual harassment, based on Title 
VII agency principles, was no longer the standard by which 
students could seek to hold school districts responsible for sex-
ual harassment where the perpetrator was either a school dis-
trict employee or another student. In other words, the Supreme 
Court made it clear in Oncale that the Title VII agency stan-
dard applies only to sexual harassment in the workplace.8 
Prior to 1998, most lower courts agreed that the appropriate 
standard of liability in Title IX cases was based on Title VII 
agency principles. 
Despite a significant increase in the number of cases of sex-
ual harassment in schools over the last ten years, courts con-
sexual harassment, of which the recipient has actual knowledge, and that harassment 
is so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it can be said to deprive the vic-
tims of access to the educational opportunities or benefits provided by the school." ld. 
at 1675. 
5. See Deshaney v. Department of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989) (holding that 
there is no agency liability for private conduct). 
6. Third party non-employees are any individuals not employed by the school 
district, including other students, who may sexually harass or abuse students at school. 
7. 523 U.S. 75 (1998). 
8. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998). 
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sistently have provided an escape from liability for school dis-
tricts seeking to avoid paying monetary damages to student 
victims of peer sexual harassment. Gebser v. Lago Vista Inde-
pendent School District9 and Davis v. Monroe County Board of 
Education10 offer the first look at how post-Oncale courts deal 
with same-gender sexual harassment cases where both perpe-
trator and victim are students. Beyond the unwillingness of 
most lower courts to hold school districts liable for sexual har-
assment of students, lower courts will have to determine how 
the new standard applies in peer sexual harassment cases 
brought under Title IXll in the wake of Gebser and Davis. The 
prevailing approach has been to adopt the Title VII12 standard 
and apply it in Title IX cases. 13 Recently, however, some courts 
have held that the Title VII standard only applies in the em-
ployment context. 14 Courts appear to have accepted this new 
9. 524 U.S. 274 (1998). 
10. 526 U.S. 629 (1999). 
11. Title IX provides that: "No person in the United States shall, on the basis of 
sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to dis-
crimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assis-
tance .... " 42 U.S.C.A. § 1681(a) (1999). 
12. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides: "[I]t shall be an unlawful 
employment practice for an employer ... to discriminate against any individual with 
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of 
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U .S.C.S. § 2000e-(a)(1) 
(1999). 
13. See Nelson v. Almont Community Sch., 931 F. Supp. 1345 (E.D. Mich. 1996); 
Pallett v. Palma, 914 F. Supp. 1018 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Burrow v. Postville Community 
Sch. Dist., 929 F. Supp. 1193 (N.D. Iowa 1996); "[T]he court determined that Title VII 
is 'the most appropriate analogue when defining Title IX's substantive standards." 
Bosley v. Kearney R-1 Sch. Dist., 904 F. Supp. 1006, 1022 (W.D. Mo. 1995), quoting 
Mabry v. State Board of Community Colleges and Occupational Education, 813 F.2d 
311, 317, n. 6 (lOth Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U. S. 849; "In Lipsett v. University of 
Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir. 1988) the court concluded that hostile environment 
lawsuits by school district employees are permitted under Title IX and adopted Title 
VII's standards for assessing a hostile environment claim." Bosley v. Kearney R-1 Sch. 
Dist., 904 F. Supp. 1006, 1022 (W.D. Mo 1995). 
14. Title VII applies only in employment cases: See Haines v. Metropolitan Gov't 
of Davidson County, 32 F. Supp. 2d 991, 998 (M.D. Tenn. 1998) (citing Oona v. McCaf-
frey, 143 F.3d 473, 477 (9th Cir. 1998)); Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 
1560 (N.D. Cal. 1993)(Court adopted Title VI standard, rejecting Title VII standard 
stating that the Title VII agency standard applies only to employment-related harass-
ment.). Title VII does not apply to sexual harassment cases involving student to stu-
dent harassment: See Doe v. Londonderry Sch. Dist., 970 F. Supp. 64, 72 (D.N.H. 
1997)("[T]he court looks to Title VII principles for guidance, but adopts a flexible ap-
proach sensitive to the differences between peer sexual harassment and employment 
contexts."). Employers are liable "for failures to remedy or prevent a hostile or offensive 
work environment of which management-level employers knew, or in the exercise of 
50 B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL [2000 
approach, thereby closing virtually all existing avenues of re-
covery for sexual harassment between student peers. The end 
result under this new paradigm most likely will be to provide 
protection for adult workers against sexual harassment by co-
workers of either sex. Meanwhile, students in public schools 
will have limited protection, if any, against peer sexual har-
assment regardless of the perpetrator's gender. 
This paper is divided into six parts. Part I traces the exis-
tence of a private cause of action for sexual harassment under 
Titles VI, 15 VII, and IX through landmark Supreme Court deci-
sions in each area. Title VII has shaped most of our under-
standing of the standard for institutional liability in sexual 
harassment cases. Therefore, Part I also contains a detailed 
examination of the Supreme Court's approach to establishing 
the existence of a private cause of action for sexual harassment 
in Title VII cases. This includes an analysis of how the mean-
ing of the "because of sex" 16 requirement affects the determina-
tion of the existence of a private cause of action for sexual har-
assment under Titles VI, VII, and IX. 
In Part II, the standard of liability under Title VI and Title 
VII will be examined from a historical perspective beginning 
with the Supreme Court's decision in Guardians Association v. 
Civil Services Commission of New York. 17 This part will con-
sider the issue of whether discriminatory intent is an essential 
element to establish liability under either Title VI or Title VII. 
The availability and type of damages under Titles VI and VII 
will be discussed to predict the availability of damages under 
Title IX. 
Part III traces the existence of private causes of action un-
der Title IX from Franklin18 to the present, including the Su-
preme Court's consideration of the issues of intent and dam-
ages in Title IX sexual harassment cases. Part IV examines the 
reasonable care should have known." ld. at 81 (citing Doe v. Petaluma, 830 F. Supp. 
1560, 1572 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (citing Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 881 (9th Cir. 1!l91) 
(quoting EEOC v. Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504, 1515-16 (9th Cir. 1989)). 
15. Section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides: "No person in the United 
States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participa· 
tion in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program 
or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 42 U.S. C.§ 2000d. (1999). 
16. Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63 (1986) (quoting Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000-2(a)(1)). 
17. 463 U.S. 582 (1982). 
18. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60 (1992). 
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application of the Title VI actual knowledge standard and the 
Title VII constructive knowledge standard in Title IX cases. 
Part V suggests that courts are abandoning the Title VII 
constructive knowledge standard in favor of the Title VI strict 
liability standard in same-gender sexual harassment cases in-
volving peers. The shift has resulted from a reexamination of 
the legislative history of Title VI which provides a more accu-
rate guide than Title VII in determining the appropriate stan-
dard of liability under Title IX. 
Part VI presents a review of the three recent Supreme 
Court decisions that have separated the issues-same-gender 
sexual harassment between co-workers, teacher to student 
sexual harassment, and peer sexual harassment between stu-
dents. In these cases, the Supreme Court has articulated three 
separate standards based on the relationship between the per-
petrator and the victim. 
I. Is THERE A PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION FOR SEXUAL 
HARASSMENT? 
This threshold question of whether a private plaintiff has a 
cause of action against a defendant under a federal statute 
such as Title IX needs to be answered before a court can de-
termine an appropriate remedy, if any, for alleged wrongdoing. 
For some time, the Supreme Court has struggled with the issue 
of determining the existence of a private cause of action. In 
Cort v. Ash, the Court announced a four-part test to determine 
Congressional intent to create a private right of action under 
Title VI. 19 In Meritor Savings Bank, FSB, v. Vinson, the Court 
recognized a private cause of action for hostile environment 
sexual harassment under Title VII. 20 In Cannon v. University 
19. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). The four-part test is as follows: 1) Plaintiff is a member of 
the class "for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted;" 2) There is any "indica-
tion of legislative intent, explicit or implicit," to support such a remedy; 3) An implied 
private right of action is consistent with the purposes of the legislative scheme; and 4) 
The cause of action is not "one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically 
the concern of the States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action 
based solely on federal law." Id. at 78. 
20. 477 U.S. 57 (1986). In Meritor, a female employee was sexually harassed by 
her male supervisor who touched her inappropriately in public, and made sexual de-
mands that she submitted to out of fear of losing her job. ld. Meritor was the first Su-
preme Court case to address hostile environment sexual harassment in the workplace 
under Title VII. Id. The Meritor test has been relied on in sexual harassment cases 
arising in the workplace and in the school setting under Titles VII and IX in deter-
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of Chicago, the Court recognized an implied private right of ac-
tion under Title IX. 21 
In Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 22 Justices 
Powell, Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun assumed, without 
deciding, that a private cause of action existed under Title VI. 
Justice White argued that Title VII provided no private cause 
of action, but Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 was 
available to private plaintiffs challenging discriminatory con-
duct committed under color of state law. Justices Stevens, Bur-
ger, Stewart, and Rehnquist concluded that a private cause of 
action was available under Title VII. 23 
Then in Cannon v. University of Chicago,24 the Court held 
that there was a private cause of action, based on the Cort fac-
tors,25 for gender-based discrimination under Title IX against 
"any educational program supported by federal funds." 26 In 
Cannon, eight justices agreed that the legislative history of 
both Title VI and Title VII supported the conclusion that a pri-
vate cause of action could be implied under Title IX. 
The question of a private right of action arose again in the 
late 1980s as instances of sexual harassment and abuse of 
public school students came to light. This time the question 
was whether or not Congress had created an implied right of 
action under Title IX for the sexual harassment of students by 
teachers. The issue seemed to be settled in a 1992 case, when 
mining liability. Id. The three part test states: (1) "that a plaintiff may establish a vio-
lation of Title VII by proving that discrimination based on sex has created a hostile or 
abusive work environment," without showing economic effect on the plaintiffs em-
ployment, id. at 66, (2) "that the fact that sex-related conduct is 'voluntary,' in the 
sense that a plaintiff was not forced to participate against her will, is not a defense to a 
sexual harassment suit under Title VII," as the correct inquiry in such cases is whether 
the plaintiff had indicated by her conduct that the alleged sexual advances were un-
welcome, id. at 67, and (3) that employers are not "always automatically liable for sex-
ual harassment of employees by their supervisors." !d. at 72. 
21. 441 U.S. 677 (1979). Supreme Court recognized a private right of action under 
Title IX for discrimination based on sex. In Cannon, a woman was denied admission to 
certain medical schools on the basis of her sex. She sued the universities and several of 
the medical schools' officials under Title IX arguing that she had been excluded from 
participation in the medical school programs because of her sex and that those medical 
schools were recipients of federal funds at the time of her exclusion. 
22. 438 U.S. 265, 281-84 (1978). 
23. See id. at 420, n.28. 
24. 441 U.S. 677 (1979). 
25. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). 
26. Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of the City of N.Y., 463 U.S. 582, 594 
(1983) (quoting Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 694-703 (1979). 
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the Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding in Cannon that "Title 
IX is enforceable through an implied right of action"27 
However, sexual harassment cases have undergone at least 
two metamorphoses since 1992. After the first wave of sexual 
harassment/abuse cases where teachers harassed/abused stu-
dents, a new harasser emerged-the fellow student. The ques-
tion then became whether a private cause of action could exist 
against a school district when the perpetrator was a private 
third party. Most recently the question has become, is there a 
private cause of action against a school district when a student 
harasser is the same gender as the student victim. Addition-
ally, the related questions of what standard of liability applies 
to Title IX peer sexual harassment cases and what damages 
are available to private parties for Title IX violations will be 
examined. 
Previously, several lower courts concluded that a private 
cause of action exists where the harasser is the victim's supe-
rior.28 Now courts must struggle to determine whether Con-
gress intended to allow private suits against state agents (i.e. 
public school officials) for same-gender peer sexual harassment. 
A series of recent Title VII cases has paved the way for our cur-
rent understanding of the viability of a private, same-gender 
sexual harassment claim under Title IX. 
The fundamental requirement for a Title VII cause of action 
is "that the discrimination occurs 'because of such individ-
ual's ... sex."'29 Applying Title VII principles to cases of same-
gender sexual harassment, the threshold question is "whether 
members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or 
27. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60 (1992). A female student 
complained the she had been sexually harassed and abused by a male teacher at the 
school. The student alleged that school officials knew of the sexual harassment and 
abuse, but they failed to take corrective action to stop the harassment. The Supreme 
Court recognized a private cause of action for damages under Title IX against school 
officials for teacher to student sexual harassment. 
28. See, e.g., Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006 (5th Cir. 1996); 
Bosley v. Kearney R-1 Sch. Dist., 904 F. Supp. 1006 (W.D. Mo. 1995). 
29. Fredette v. BPV Management Assocs., 112 F.3d 1503, 1505 (ll'h Cir. 1997) 
(citing Meritor Savs. Bank, FSB, v. Vinson 477 U.S. 57, 63 (1986)). This Title VII case 
involved claims of same-sex harassment under both quid pro quo and hostile environ-
ment sexual harassment theories. In Fredette, a male waiter was propositioned for sex 
by the restaurant's homosexual maitre d'. Fredette complained that his refusals to ac-
cept the sexual propositions resulted in work-related retaliation against him. The ques-
tion in Fredette was whether Title VII provided a cause of action for same-gender sex-
ual harassment in the workplace. 
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conditions of employment to which members of the other sex 
are not exposed."30 Therefore, the only actionable claim under 
Title VII for sexual harassment is one " that is in some way 
linked to the plaintiffs sex."31 
Lower federal courts, relying in part on earlier sexual har-
assment cases in the workplace, have been grappling with the 
same-gender sexual harassment issue since 1993.32 In thirteen 
cases, lower federal courts have held that same-gender sexual 
harassment is actionable under Title VII. 33 During that same 
period, ten lower federal courts held that Title VII provided no 
cause of action for same-gender sexual harassment. 34 This split 
in the lower courts led to the Supreme Court decision to hear 
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc. 35 in order to re-
solve the conflict. Prior to the March 1998 Oncale decision, the 
30. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998) (quoting 
Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
31. Doe v. City of Belleville, Ill., 119 F.3d 563, 570 (7th Cir. 1997) (citing Carr v. 
Allison Gas Turbine Div., Gen. Motors Corp., 32 F.3d 1007, 1009 (7th Cir. 1994)). Two 
teen boys, who were employed by the City of Belleville, were harassed by their male co-
workers in an escalating sexual manner. Verbal taunts turned physical and the boys 
decided to quit their jobs. The question in Doe was whether Title VII created a cause of 
action for sexual harassment based on sex where both the victim and the harasser were 
males. 
32. See infra notes 33 and 34. 
33. See Yeary v. Goodwill Indus.-Knoxville, Inc., 107 F.3d 443 (6th Cir. 1997); 
Fredette v. BVP Management Assocs., 112 F.3d 1503 (11th Cir. 1997); Wrightson v. 
Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138 (4th Cir. 1996); McDonnell v. Cisneros, 84 F.3d 256, 
260 (7th Cir. 1996); Quick v. Donaldson Co., 90 F.3d 1372 (8th Cir. 1996); Baskerville 
v. Culligan Int'l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 430 (7th Cir. 1995); Steiner v. Showboat Operating 
Co., 25 F.3d 1459 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied 513 U.S. 1082 (1995); Saulpaugh v. 
Monroe Comm. Hasp., 4 F. 3d 134 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied 510 U.S. 1164 (1994); Pur-
rington v. Univ. of Utah, 996 F.2d 1025 (lOth Cir. 1993); Morgan v. Massachusetts 
Gen. Hasp., 901 F.2d 186 (1st Cir. 1990); Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 
1981); Barnes v. Castle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & 
Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977). 
34. See Torres v. National Precision Blanking Div. of Nat'! Material L.P., 943 F. 
Supp. 952 (N.D. Ill. 1996); Schoiber v. Emro Mktg. Co., 941 F. Supp. 730 (N.D. Ill. 
1996); Larry v. North Miss. Med. Ctr., 940 F. Supp. 960 (N.D. Miss. 1996); Ashworth v. 
Roundup Co., 897 F. Supp 489 (W.D. Wash. 1995); Sarff v. Continental Express, 894 F. 
Supp. 1076 (S.D. Tex. 1995), aff'd without published opinion 85 F. 3d 624 (5th Cir. 
1996); Meyers v. City ofEI Paso, 874 F. Supp. 1546 (W.D. Tex. 1995); Pasqua v. Metro-
politan Life Ins. Co., No. 94 C 4418, 1995 U.S. Dist. Lexis 17108 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 16, 
1995), aff'd on other grounds, 101 F.3d 514 (7th Cir. 1996); Fleenor v. Hewitt Soap Co. 
67 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. CAS. (BNA) 1625 (S.D. Ohio 1994), aff'd on other grounds, 81 F.3d 
48 (6th Cir. 1996), cert denied, 519 U.S. 863 (1996); Vandeventer v. Wabash Nat'! Corp, 
867 F. Supp. 790 (N.D. Ind.1994), mod. on recons. 887 F. Supp. 1178 (N.D. Ind. 1995); 
Dillon v. Frank, 58 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. CAS. (BNA) 90 (E.D. Mich. 1990), aff'd by unpub-
lished opinion 952 F.2d 403 (6th Cir. 1992). 
35. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998). 
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leading case concerning the existence of a cause of action under 
Title VII for same-gender sexual harassment was Doe u. City of 
Belleville, Illinois. 36 In Doe, a case involving conduct between 
co-workers that the victim claimed amounted to sexual har-
assment, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals had to find a 
nexus between gender and harassment in order to conclude 
that same-gender sexual harassment between co-workers was 
actionable under Title VII. 
Establishing the nexus between gender and harassment, for 
the purpose of establishing a cause of action under Title VII for 
same-gender sexual harassment, raises two questions: 
1) Can a man ever establish that he was harassed 'because of 
his sex in violation of Title VII, when the harassment he com-
plains of was inflicted by another man? ... 
2) If sexual harassment of a male by another male is action-
able under Title VII, must the plaintiff offer proof, beyond the 
explicitly sexual nature of the harassment, that his gender 
motivated the harasser and that a similarly situated female 
worker would not have been harassed?37 
The second question inquires whether or not a plaintiff 
must prove that the harasser is "sexually oriented toward the 
same gender."38 That is, does the plaintiff have to prove that 
the harasser is a homosexual, and therefore attracted to the 
victim "because of' his sex? 
Responding "yes" to the initial inquiry and "no" to the sec-
ond, the Seventh Circuit concluded that same-gender sexual 
harassment is actionable under Title VII because "Title VII on 
its face draws no distinction between men and women, either 
as plaintiffs or harassers, and the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission (EEOC) describes sexual harassment in 
gender-neutral terms."39 
While some recent case law suggests that the victim of 
same-gender sexual harassment does not have to prove that 
the harasser is attracted to the victim because of the harasser's 
attraction to members of the same sex. 40 Judge Niemeyer for 
36. 119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997). 
37. 119 F.3d at 570. 
38. !d. 
39. !d. 
40. See Yeary v. Goodwill lndus.-Knoxville, Inc., 107 F.3d 443 (6th Cir. 1997); 
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the Fourth Circuit stated that "where the harasser and the vic-
tim are of the same gender, a presumption exists that sexually 
suggestive conduct ... [between members of the same gender] 
is usually motivated by entirely different reasons [than gen-
der]."41 Therefore, the Fourth Circuit was hesitant to find a 
cause of action for same-gender sexual harassment unless the 
harasser was homosexual, "because in that type of case, an 
employee can prove he was harassed by an employee of the 
same sex 'because of the harassed employee's sex,' as required 
by Title VII."42 
A few courts have held that same-gender sexual harass-
ment is not actionable under Title VII, 43 but the predominant 
opinion among lower courts is that same-gender sexual har-
assment is actionable under Title VII.44 In March 1998, the 
Fredette v. BVP Management Assocs., 112 F. 3d 1503 (11th Cir. 1997). Yeary is a same-
gender sexual harassment case where a male worker alleged that he was sexually har-
assed by a male co-worker. The question in Yemy was whether there was a cause of 
action under Title VII for same-gender sexual harassment. 
41. Fredette v. BVP Management Assocs., 112 F.3d 1503, 1508 (11th Cir. 1997) 
(quoting Niemeyer, J., in Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745, 752 (4th 
Cir. 1996), cert. denied 519 U.S. 818 (1996) (emphasis added). 
42. Wrightson v. Pizza Hut, 99 F. 3d 138, 142 (4th Cir. 1996) (quoting McWilliams 
v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 
U.S. 819 (1996)). 
43. See Garcia v. Elf Atochem North America, 28 F. 3d 446 (1994). Garcia is a Ti-
tle VII same-gender sexual harassment case involving male co-workers. The Fifth Cir-
cuit Court did not recognize a cause of action for same-gender sexual harassment under 
Title VII; Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 83 F.3d 118 (5th Cir. 1996). 
44. See Yeary v. Goodwill Indus.-Knoxville, Inc. 107 F.3d 443 (6th Cir. 1997); 
Fredette v. BVP Management Assocs., 112 F.3d 1503 (11th Cir. 1997); Quick v. Don-
aldson Co., 90 F.3d 1372 (8th Cir. 1996); Caldwell v. KFC Corp., 958 F. Supp. 962 
(D.N.J. 1997); McCoy v. Macon Water Authority, 966 F. Supp. 1209 (M.D. Ga. 1997); 
Gerd v. United Parcel Servs., Inc., 934 F. Supp. 357 (D. Colo. 1996); Williams v. Dis-
trict of Columbia, 916 F. Supp. 1 ( D.D.C. 1996); Miller v. Vesta, Inc., 946 F. Supp. 697 
(E.D. Wis. 1996); Johnson v. Hondo, Inc. 940 F. Supp. 1403 (E.D. Wis. 1996); Peric v. 
Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ill., 71 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. CAS. (BNA) 1760 (N.D. Ill. 
1996); Shermer v. Illinois Dept. of Transp., 937 F. Supp. 781 (C.D. Ill. 1996); Kaplan v. 
Dacomed Corp., No. 95C6987, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2232 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 27, 1996); Ton 
v. Information Resources, Inc., 70 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. CAS. (BNA) 355 (N.D. Ill. 1996); 
Waag v. Thomas Pontiac, Buick, GMC, Inc., 930 F. Supp. 393 (D. Minn. 1996); Wehrle 
v. Office Depot, Inc., 954 F. Supp. 234 (W.D. Okla. 1996); Swage v. Inn Philadelphia, 72 
FAIR EMPL. PRAC. CAS. (BNA) 438 (E.D. Pa. 1996); Johnson v. Community Nursing 
Servs., 932 F. Supp. 269 (D. Utah 1996); Tietgen v. Brown's Westminster Motors, Inc., 
921 F. Supp. 1495 (E.D. Va. 1996); Easton v. Crossland Mortgage Corp., 905 F. Supp. 
1368 (C.D. Cal. 1995), reu'd on other grounds, 114 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 1997); Raney v. 
District of Columbia, 892 F. Supp. 283 (D.D.C. 1995); Boyd v. Vonnahmen, 67 FAIR 
EMPL. PRAC. CAS. (BNA) 1769 (S.D. Ill. 1995); Blozis v. Mike Raisor Ford, Inc., 896 F. 
Supp. 805 (N.D. Ind. 1995); Griffith v. Keystone Steel & Wire, Div. Keystone Consol. 
Indus., Inc., 887 F. Supp. 1133 (C.D. Ill. 1995); Sardinia v. Dellwood Food, Inc., No. 94 
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Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit's decision with On-
cale, 45 thereby agreeing with the majority of lower courts that 
same-gender sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII. 
The Supreme Court appears to have adopted the Doe v. City 
of Belleville46 holding in Oncale: that same-gender sexual har-
assment is actionable under Title VII, and that Title VII pro-
tects both men and women against discrimination "because of 
sex."47 This is a landmark decision for adult co-workers sub-
jected to same-gender sexual harassment in the workplace, but 
an important question remains: what effect will the Oncale de-
cision have on public school students subjected to sexual har-
assment by same-gender peers? Because the Oncale decision is 
based on Title VII and not Title IX, it may not have much in-
fluence on cases of same-gender peer sexual harassment be-
tween students. But several courts that have considered sexual 
harassment cases involving students have followed the Title 
VII standard in sexual harassment cases involving students.48 
It remains to be seen what impact Oncale will have on student 
to student sexual harassment cases. 
II. STANDARDS OF LIABILITY FOR SEXUAL HARASSMENT: Is 
INTENT REQillRED? 
There has been considerable litigation, both inside and out-
side the public school context, over whether or not a plaintiff is 
required to prove discriminatory intent in order to establish a 
violation of a federal statute and qualify for some remedy. Liti-
gation outside the school context has explored the intent issue 
Civ. 5458 (LAP), 1995 WL 640502 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 1995); King v. M. R. Brown, Inc., 
911 F. Supp. 161 (E.D. Pa. 1995); Joyner v. AAA Cooper Transp., 597 F. Supp. 537 
(M.D. Ala. 1983), aff'd without published op., 749 F. 2d 732 (11th Cir. 1984); Wright v. 
Methodist Youth Servs., Inc., 511 F. Supp. 307 (N.D. Ill. 1981). 
45. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998); See Oncale v. 
Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 83 F. 3d 118 (5th Cir. 1996). 
46. 119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997). 
47. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78 (1998) (quoting 
Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 682 (1983). 
48. See Murray v. New York City College of Dentistry, 53 F.3d 243 (2d Cir. 1995); 
Wright v. Mason City Community Sch. Dist., 940 F. Supp. 1412 (N.D. Iowa 1996); Bur-
row v. Postville Sch. Dist., 929 F. Supp. 1193 (N.D. Iowa 1996); Nelson v. Almont 
Community Sch., 931 F. Supp. 1345 (E.D. Mich. 1996); Bruneau v. South Kortright 
Cent. Sch. Dist., 935 F. Supp. 162 (N.D.N.Y. 1996); Linson v. Trustees of the Univ. of 
Pa., No. 95-3681, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12243 (E.D. Pa. August 21, 1996); Patricia H. 
v. Berkeley Unified Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1288 (N.D. Cal. 1993). 
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under both Title VI and Title VII. Various courts that relied on 
these rulings later tried to answer the intent question under 
Title IX. Therefore, a brief look at whether or not discrimina-
tory intent is required under Titles VI and VII will set the 
stage for a discussion of the resulting confusion that has arisen 
over the issue of discriminatory intent in Title IX cases. It also 
will illustrate the dilemma facing courts when they address the 
issue of the existence of a cause of action under Title IX for 
same-gender sexual harassment between students. 
The difficulty in attempting to answer the question whether 
or not discriminatory intent is required to establish a violation 
of Title IX is that from the very beginning the Supreme Court 
has not provided clear guidance on this point. The confusion 
stems from the conflicting approaches the Supreme Court has 
taken in several key cases which make it difficult to know if 
applications of Title IX will be guided by interpretations of Ti-
tle VI, interpretations of Title VII, or some combination of the 
two. 
A. Title VI Standard 
Section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides: 
No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, 
color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be 
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under 
any program or activity receiving Federal financial assis-
tance. 49 
Some courts have argued that Title IX should follow Title 
VI requirements because Title IX is modeled after Title VI. In 
Guardians Association v. Civil Services Commission of City of 
New York, 50 the Supreme Court attempted to clarify whether 
discriminatory intent was an essential element of a Title VI 
violation. Five justices agreed that the Court of Appeals erred 
when it held that a private plaintiff was required to prove dis-
criminatory intent to qualify for relief under Title VI. However, 
the only thing that a majority of the justices in Guardians 
could agree on was that Title VI relief was not appropriate un-
der the facts presented in Guardians. 
Justice White, speaking for the majority in Guardians, an-
nounced that discriminatory intent is not an essential element 
49. 42 U.S. C.§ 2000d. (1999). 
50. 463 U.S. 582 (1982). 
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of a Title VI violation. This opened the door for a private plain-
tiff to seek relief for unintentional discrimination under Title 
VI. Relief for unintentional discrimination could come from a 
violation of the administrative implementing regulations of Ti-
tle VI, 51 adopted to enforce the provisions of Title VI. 52 Justice 
White agreed with Justice Marshall in Guardians that the ad-
ministrative regulations of Title VI, incorporating a disparate 
impact standard, are valid. 53 As such, discriminatory intent is 
not an essential element to establish a violation of Title VI, 
even though "Title VI, in and of itself, does not proscribe dispa-
rate-impact discrimination."54 This means that a plaintiff 
bringing a private action claiming violations of both Title VI 
and the administrative implementing regulations will be enti-
tled to relief upon proof of disparate-impact discrimination 
alone. The issue then becomes: what type of remedy will be al-
lowed where there has been no intentional discrimination? 
That issue will be discussed in the next section. 
51. The administrative implementing regulations of Title VI state: 
Each federal department and agency which is empowered to extend federal finan-
cial assistance to any program or activity, by way of grant, loan, or contract other 
than a contract or insurance or guaranty, is authorized and directed to effectuate 
the provisions or section 2000d of this title with respect to such program or activity 
by issuing rules, regulations, or orders of general applicability which shall be con-
sistent with achievement of the objectives of the statute authorizing the financial 
assistance in connection with which the action is taken .... Compliance with any 
requirement adopted pursuant to this section may be effected (1) by the termina-
tion of or refusal to grant or to continue assistance under such program or activity 
to any recipient as to whom there has been an express finding on the record, after 
opportunity for hearing, of a failure to comply with such requirement, but such 
termination or refusal shall be limited to the particular political entity, or part 
thereof, or other recipient as to whom such a finding has been made and, shall be 
limited in its effect to the particular program, or part thereof, in which such non-
compliance has been found, or (2) by an other means authorized by law: provided, 
however, that no such action shall be taken until the department or agency con-
cerned has advised the appropriate person or persons of the failure to comply with 
the requirement and has determined that compliance cannot be secured by volun-
tary means. In the case of any action terminating, or refusing to grant or continue, 
assistance because of failure to comply with a requirement imposed pursuant to 
this section, the head of the federal department or agency shall file with commit-
tees of the House and Senate having legislative jurisdiction over the program or 
activity involved a full written report of the circumstances and the grounds for 
such action. No such action shall be come effective until thirty days have elapsed 
after the filing of such report. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1999). 
52. See Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974). 
53. See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Servs. Comm'n of the City of New York, 463 U.S. 
582 (1982). 
54. Id. at 584 n.2. 
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The Court's ruling in Guardians, that Title VI reaches both 
intentional and unintentional discrimination, has found subse-
quent support in Alexander u. Choate, 55 as well as earlier sup-
port for the notion that Title VI does not require proof of dis-
criminatory intent.56 While five justices agreed with the result 
reached by the Court of Appeals, each justice reached that con-
clusion for different reasons. 
Justice White, speaking for the majority in Guardians, held 
that discriminatory intent is not an essential element of a Title 
VI violation. Justice Powell and Chief Justice Burger agreed 
with the Court of Appeals that there is no implied private 
cause of action under Title VI. Justices Burger and Rehnquist 
believed that intentional discrimination is a prerequisite to a 
successful Title VI claim, and Justice O'Connor argued that in-
tentional discrimination is required to establish a valid Title VI 
claim. As a result, Justice O'Connor concluded that the imple-
menting regulations incorporating the disparate impact stan-
dard are not valid. Dissenting Justice Stevens, joined by Jus-
tices Brennan and Blackmun, disagreed with Justice O'Connor 
and concluded that the administrative regulations, incorpo-
rating the disparate impact standard, are valid despite the fact 
that Title VI itself requires proof of intentional discrimination. 
Justice Marshall was the most lenient of all the justices in 
stating that a private plaintiff needed only to prove disparate 
impact discrimination to establish a violation of Title VI. 
Therefore, based on Guardians, if an individual claims vio-
lations of both Title VI and its implementing regulations, then 
proof of discriminatory intent is not an essential element. The 
same rule also would apply under Title IX and its implement-
ing regulations if the Guardians interpretation of Title VI were 
followed. 57 
Prior to the Supreme Court ruling in Davis u. Monroe 
County Board of Education, 58 the Title VI standard applied to 
sexual harassment cases in the public school setting required 
proof of intentional discrimination as demonstrated by: 1) di-
rect involvement of the school district in the discrimination; or 
55. 469 U.S. 287 (1985). 
56. See also Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Lau v. Nich-
ols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974); Villanueva v. Carere, 85 F.3d 481 (lOth Cir. 1996). 
57. See Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agriculture, 998 F.2d 824 (lOth Cir. 
1993). 
58. 526 U.S. 629 (1999). 
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2) a showing that the school district had actual or constructive 
knowledge about the sexual harassment of students, and that 
the school failed to take immediate remedial action.59 However, 
Guardians established that the implementation regulations of 
Title VI reach unintentional discrimination. Therefore, the cur-
rent application of Title VI, requiring proof of intentional dis-
crimination, is contrary to Guardians and imposes a higher 
standard for student victims of sexual harassment than adult 
victims are required to meet. 
B. Damages 
It seems fairly well-settled that money damages are avail-
able only in cases where the plaintiff has proven intentional 
discrimination in Title VI and Title VII cases. This rule also is 
finding acceptance in Title IX cases. 
Relying on Guardians, 60 most courts have applied the fol-
lowing rule: "where legal rights have been invaded and a cause 
of action is available, a federal court may use any available 
remedy to afford full relief."61 The only exception to this gen-
eral rule is where application of the rule would violate the in-
tent of Congress or frustrate the statute's purposes. 62 But, the 
Court added that the amount of compensatory damages (money 
damages) to be awarded for a defendant's intentional miscon-
duct will depend "on the extent of his knowledge or culpabil-
ity."63 
C. Title VII Standard 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides: 
[I]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an em-
ployer ... to discriminate against any individual with respect 
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of em-
59. See Nelson v. Almont Community Sch., 931 F. Supp. 1345, 1355 (E.D. Mich. 
1996); Oona v. Santa Rosa City Sch., 890 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. Cal. 1995); Howard v. 
Board of Educ., 876 F. Supp. 959 (N.D. Ill. 1995); Letlow v. Evans, 857 F. Supp. 676 
(W.D. Mo. 1994); Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1560, 1576 (N.D. Cal. 
1993); Floyd v. Waiters, 831 F. Supp. 867 (M.D. Ga. 1993); R.L.R. v. Prague Pub. Sch. 
Dist. I-103, 838 F. Supp. 1526 (W.D. Okla. 1993). 
60. 463 U.S. 582 (1982). 
61. Guardians, 463 U.S. at 595 (citing Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)) 
(emphasis added). 
62. See id. at 595. 
63. !d. at 597, n. 20 (emphasis added). 
62 B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL [2000 
ployment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin. 64 
The question of intent also arises under Title VII. In Re-
gents of the University of California v. Bakke, 65 the Supreme 
Court held that disparate impact alone was insufficient to es-
tablish a Title VII violation. However, the Court held that dis-
parate impact could be used as a basis for relief under Title VII 
if the challenged practice was not based on a business neces-
sity, or "if it lacked a manifest relationship to the employment 
in question."66 
The leading case applying Title VII principles to a work-
place sexual harassment claim is Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. 
Vinson. 67 In Meritor the Court held, for the first time, that hos-
tile environment sexual harassment constitutes a form of sex 
discrimination. As such, it is actionable under Title VII. This 
conclusion is based on EEOC Guidelines that provide an "ad-
ministrative interpretation of [Title VII] by the enforcing 
agency."68 The EEOC Guidelines assist the Court in "inter-
preting the Act's prohibition against discrimination based on 
'sex."'69 
Relying on the language of Title VII, the Meritor Court held 
that "[t]he phrase 'terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment' evinces a congressional intent 'to strike at the entire 
spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women' in em-
ployment."70 Further, the Court accepted the Fifth Circuit's in-
terpretation in Rogers v. EEOC,71 that a Title VII cause of ac-
tion goes beyond the potential economic impact caused by 
workplace discrimination: 
[T]he phrase 'terms, conditions, or privileges of employment' 
in [Title VII] is an expansive concept which sweeps within its 
protective ambit the practice of creating a working environ-
ment heavily charged with ethnic or racial discrimina-
64. 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000e- 2(a)(1) (1999). 
65. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
66. Id. at 309. 
67. 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
68. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-434 (1971). 
69. Meritor Savs. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63 (1986) (citing 100 Cong. 
Rec. 2577-2584 at 2577 (1964)). 
70. Id. (quoting Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 
707, n. 13 (1978)) (quoting Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F. 2d 1194, 1198 (7th 
Cir. 1971)). 
71. 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971). 
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tion .... One can readily envision working environments so 
heavily polluted with discrimination as to destroy completely 
the emotional and psychological stability of minority group 
workers .... 72 
63 
In Meritor, the Supreme Court extended the Rogers holding 
by stating, "Sexual harassment which creates a hostile or of-
fensive environment for members of one sex is every bit the ar-
bitrary barrier to sexual equality at the workplace that racial 
harassment is to racial equality."73 
It is important to note that not all conduct that can be de-
scribed as harassment, "affects a 'term, condition, or privilege' 
of employment within the meaning of Title VII."74 To establish 
a violation of Title VII for hostile environment sexual harass-
ment, a plaintiff must prove both that the discrimination is 
based on sex and that the discrimination created a hostile or 
abusive work environment. 
The Supreme Court, in Meritor, defined actionable sexual 
harassment under Title VII to "be sufficiently severe or perva-
sive 'to alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment and 
create an abusive working environment."'75 Further, actionable 
sexual harassment requires the plaintiff to prove that the sex-
ual advances are unwelcome.76 
With regard to employer liability for hostile environment 
sexual harassment, the Supreme Court declined to announce a 
rule for employer liability. The Court did accept the EEOC's 
conclusion that Congress intended courts to consider agency 
principles in determining the employer's liability. 77 
While the Supreme Court did not decide in Meritor what 
the standard for employer liability will be, it did discuss the 
concept of employer notice drawn from agency principles. Tra-
ditionally, employers are held liable for the discriminatory con-
duct of their supervisory personnel even where the employer 
was unaware (knew or should have known) of the supervisor's 
discriminatory conduct. 
72. !d. at 238. 
73. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (1982)). 
74. ld. at 67. 
75. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (1982)); 
See also Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971). 
76. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 68, noted in 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (a) (1985). 
77. "Congress' decision to define 'employer' to include any 'agent' of an employer, 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), surely evinces an intent to place some limits on the acts of em-
ployees for which employers under Title VII are to be held responsible." Id. at 72. 
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The EEOC suggested an alternative standard for hostile 
environment sexual harassment cases. That standard exam-
ines the availability of a complaint process, whether or not the 
victim of sexual harassment utilized the procedure, and 
whether or not the procedure was responsive to the victim's 
complaint_78 Under the EEOC's rule, where an employer "has 
an expressed policy against sexual harassment and has imple-
mented a procedure specifically designed to resolve sexual har-
assment claims, and if the victim does not take advantage of 
that procedure, the employer should be shielded from liability 
absent actual knowledge of the sexually hostile environ-
ment."79 Otherwise, an employer will be liable only if "it has 
actual knowledge of the harassment,"80 or there was "no rea-
sonably available avenue for making his or her complaint 
known to appropriate management officials."81 The first ap-
plies where the employer has a complaint process that the vic-
tim does not use to report the harassment, thereby failing to 
notify the employer of the discriminatory conduct. There, the 
victim is at fault for failing to avail herself of the available 
remedy. The second applies where the employer has no re-
porting procedure so the victim is unable to report the conduct. 
The failure to report is not the victim's fault because the em-
ployer never informed potential victims of the reporting proc-
ess. 
Ill. PEER SEXUAL HARASSMENT: IS THERE A PRIVATE CAUSE OF 
ACTION UNDER TITLE IX? 
Title IX provides that: 
No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be 
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be 
subjected to discrimination under any education program or 
activity receiving Federal financial assistance.82 
As with each of the preceding federal statutes, it is neces-
sary to determine under Title IX whether or not a private cause 
of action exists before any remedies can be considered. The is-
78. See id. at 71. 
79. !d. 
80. !d. 
81. !d. at 71 (quoting Brief for United States and EEOC as Amici Curiae 26). 
82. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1681(a) (1999). 
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sue of whether there is a private cause of action for student to 
student sexual harassment has been considered several times 
in the past three years, but the issue was far from being settled 
until the May 1999, Supreme Court decision in Davis v. Monroe 
County Board of Education. 83 While the Court held in Franklin 
v. Gwinnett County Public Schools84 that there is a private 
cause of action under Title IX for teacher to student sexual 
harassment, there had not been agreement that a Title IX 
cause of action existed in cases involving student to student 
sexual harassment until Davis. 
There have been a few cases where courts have concluded 
that a private cause of action exists for student to student hos-
tile environment sexual harassment,85 but there are other 
cases on the subject where courts have not addressed the issue 
of the existence of a private right of action. At least one court 
concluded that there is no cause of action for student to student 
sexual harassment. 86 In Rowinsky v. Bryan Independent School 
District,87 the Fifth Circuit held that there is no cause of action 
under Title IX "absent allegations that the school itself directly 
discriminated based on sex." 88 Thus Rowinsky would apply the 
Title VI standard requiring some connection between the al-
leged discrimination and the actions of school officials.89 In 
student to student sexual harassment cases, the Rowinsl?y 
court concluded there is no such link because the harasser is 
not a school district employee, and there is no power relation-
ship between the harasser and the victim for which the school 
83. 526 U.S. 629 (1999). 
84. 503 U.S. 60 (1992). 
85. See Doe v. Londonderry Sch. Dist., 32 F. Supp. 2d 1360 (D.N.H. 1997); Nicole 
M. v. Martinez Unified Sch. Dist., 964 F. Supp. 1369 (N.D. Cal. 1997); Collier v. Wil-
liam Penn Sch. Dist., 956 F. Supp. 1209 (E. D. Pa. 1997); Bruneau v. South Kortright 
Cent. Sch. Dist., 935 F. Supp. 162 (N.D.N.Y. 1996); Burrow v. Postville Community 
Sch. Dist., 929 F. Supp. 1193 (N.D. Iowa 1996); Wright v. Mason City Community Sch. 
Dist., 940 F. Supp. 1412 (N.D. Iowa 1996); Bosley v. Kearney R-1 Sch. Dist., 904 F. 
Supp. 1006 (W.D. Mo. 1995); Oona v. Santa Rosa City Sch., 890 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. 
Cal. 1995). 
86. See Garza v. Galena Park Independent Sch. Dist., 914 F. Supp. 1437, 1438 
(S.D. Tex. 1994) ("a student cannot bring a hostile environment claim under Title IX"). 
87. 80 F.3d 1006 (5th Cir. 1996) cert. denied, 519 U.S. 861 (1996). Title IX, stu-
dent to student sexual harassment case holding that a school district cannot be held 
liable under Title IX unless "the school district itself directly discriminated based on 
sex." !d. at 1008. 
88. Id. at 1006; See also, Bosley v. Kearney R-1 Sch. Dist., 904 F. Supp. 1006 
(W.D. Mo. 1995). 
89. Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1008. 
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district could be held liable. In Doe v. Petaluma City School 
District,90 the court held that "no damages may be obtained 
under Title IX (merely) for a school district's failure to take ap-
propriate action in response to complaints of student to student 
sexual harassment."91 The Eleventh Circuit, in Davis v. 
Monroe County Board of Education,92 held that Franklin cre-
ated a private cause of action for victims of teacher to student 
sexual harassment, but not for student to student sexual har-
assment. Still other courts have resolved cases of student to 
student sexual harassment without ever deciding whether or 
not a cause of action exists.93 Despite the hesitation among 
lower courts to address the issue of a private cause of action 
once and for all, courts in most Title IX cases involving peer 
sexual harassment between students appear to accept the no-
tion that there is a private cause of action under Title IX. The 
conclusion that a Title IX cause of action exists is based on the 
existence of private causes of action under Titles VI and VII. 94 
Two issues, remnants of debates in Title VI and Title VII 
cases, have created a great deal of confusion in peer sexual 
harassment cases under Title IX involving public school stu-
dents. The first issue is whether intentional discrimination is 
required to establish a violation of Title IX for which a plaintiff 
can recover money damages. The second issue revolves around 
the role intent plays in determining the applicable standard of 
liability for Title IX violations.95 
90. 830 F. Supp. 1560 (N.D. Cal. 1993). 
91. ld. at 1575. 
92. 120 F.3d 1390 (11th Cir. 1997). 
93. See Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226 (lOth Cir. 1996) (holding that the plaintiff 
failed to state a claim for student to student sexual harassment); Murray v. New York 
Univ. College of Dentistry, 57 F.3d 243, 250 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that even if Title IX 
created a private cause of action for sexual harassment by a non-employee of the 
school, Plaintiff failed to allege that school officials knew or should have known of the 
harassment); and Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 54 F.3d 1447, 1452 (9th Cir. 1995), 
(holding that a school counselor is entitled to qualified immunity). 
94. See Nicole M. v. Martinez Unified Sch. Dist., 964 F. Supp. 1369, 1380 (N.D. 
Cal. 1997). A female student reported being sexually harassed by male students in her 
class. She sued the school district under Title IX alleging that the school district, a re-
cipient of federal funds, discriminated against her on the basis of sex for failing to stop 
the sexual harassment inflicted on her. In Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 
677 (1979), the Supreme Court recognized "that Title IX clearly creates an enforceable 
right."; Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60 (1992); Oona v. McCaffrey, 
122F.3d 1207 (9th Cir. 1997); Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ , 120 F. 3d 1390 
(11th Cir. 1997). 
95. See Franklin v. Gwinnett Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60 (1992); Oona v. McCaffrey, 
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A. Is Intent Required for Compensatory Relief? 
There is less discussion of whether or not intent is required 
to establish a violation of Title IX than there was for Title VI 
and Title VII violations. Courts seem willing to accept the con-
clusion reached by the Supreme Court that in Title VI cases in-
tent is required where a victim seeks money damages.96 Once 
it has been established that an institution has intentionally 
discriminated against the plaintiff, the court will award money 
damages to compensate the plaintiff for injuries suffered as a 
result of the intentionally discriminatory conduct of the schools 
that are recipients of federal financial assistance. 97 This rule 
was extended to Title IX cases in Cannon v. University of Chi-
cago.98 
The Supreme Court concluded in Cannon that Congress in-
tended to create remedies under Title IX that were "compara-
ble" to Title VI remedies because Title IX is modeled after Title 
VI. 99 Therefore, absent a showing of intentional discrimination, 
courts will award only declaratory and limited injunctive re-
lief.IDO 
The reason for restricting compensatory damages to cases 
of intentional discrimination centers on the presence or ab-
sence of notice. If the recipient of federal funds is not a partici-
pant in the discriminatory conduct, as in cases of student to 
student sexual harassment, then the recipient has no knowl-
edge of the wrongful conduct and, therefore, lacks notice of the 
violation. In such instances, the recipient should not be pun-
ished for behavior committed by others. No such notice exists 
in cases of unintentional discrimination where the institution 
122 F.3d 1207 (9th Cir. 1997); Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 120 F.3d 1390 
(11th Cir. 1997); Nicole M. v. Martinez Unified Sch. Dist., 964 F. Supp. 1369 (N.D. Cal. 
1997). 
96. See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985); Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. 
Comm'n of City of New York, 463 U.S. 582 (1983); Villanueva v. Carere, 85 F.3d 481 
(lOth Cir. 1996). 
97. See id. 
98. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979). 
99. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 694-698 (1979) ("We have 
no doubt that Congress wtended to create Title IX remedies comparable to those avail-
able under Title VI and that It understood Title V7 as authorizing an imp}jed p · t ;~~s~::.~~~~n (;~ v;;i~; oJ:i; prohibited discrimination.'). See Frankhn v. Gw1~::te 
779 (3rd. Cir. 1990).· ' ( ~- Pfeiffer v. Manon Center Area Sch. Dist., 917 F.2d 
100. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677,694-698 (1979). 
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is unaware of any discrimination. 101 In those cases, courts 
agree that institutions should not be held liable for discrimina-
tory conduct of which they were unaware. 102 
The rationale for this rule stems from the legislative history 
of Title VI discussed at length in Guardians. 103 A contrary 
ruling would frustrate the Congressional intent behind 
Spending Clause legislation such as Titles VI and IX, and 
might lead some institutions to refuse to accept federal funds. 
In Title IX cases, intentional discrimination by recipients of 
federal funds establishes proof that the recipient had knowl-
edge that discriminatory conduct had occurred. This knowledge 
stems from the active participation of the recipient in the dis-
criminatory conduct. That is the type of conduct Congress in-
tended to punish by imposing compensatory damages for inten-
tional discrimination. 
B. The role of Intent 
The rule regarding notice to recipients of federal financial 
assistance in a Title IX context was further explained by the 
Eleventh Circuit in Davis v. Monroe County Board of Educa-
tion.104 In Davis, the court stated that "an enactment under 
the Spending Clause must unambiguously disclose to would-be 
recipients all facts material to their decision to accept Title IX 
funding." 105 The Davis court concluded that the legislative his-
tory of Title IX contains no indication that Congress gave 
school districts and teachers "clear notice" that by accepting 
federal funds they also "would accept responsibility for reme-
dying student-student sexual harassment." 106 
The Eleventh Circuit's ruling in Davis appeared to foreclose 
suits against school districts for student to student sexual har-
assment on the ground that the legislative history contains no 
notice to school districts that they are subject to liability for 
101. But see Nicole M. v. Martinez Unified Sch. Dist., 964 F. Supp. 1369, 1378 
(N.D. Cal. 1997) (where the court stated that the knew or should have known standard 
"requires actual notice or a severity or pervasiveness of harassing conduct that would 
ordinarily create notice."). 
102. See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of the City of N.Y., 463 U.S. 582 
(1983); Wright v. Mason City Community Sch. Dist., 940 F. Supp. 1412 (N.D. Iowa 
1996). 
103. Guardians, 463 U.S. at 602. 
104. 120 F. 3d 1390 (11th Cir. 1997). 
105. ld. at 1406. 
106. Id. 
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peer sexual harassment between students. If the Davis ap-
proach were adopted by other courts, peer sexual harassment 
suits involving students as harasser and victim would be virtu-
ally eliminated as an avenue toward a potential remedy for 
student victims of peer sexual harassment. But recently some 
courts have questioned this conclusion, arguing instead that 
the language of Title IX gives notice to recipients of federal 
funds to maintain an institution free of discrimination. There-
fore, school districts may be held liable for their actions and in-
actions in response to complaints of sexual harassment because 
Title IX states that recipients of federal funds are on notice to 
maintain an environment free from discrimination. Inaction af-
ter a student complains to a school official constitutes notice of 
discriminatory conduct. Failure to act in order to end the dis-
crimination is equivalent to deliberate indifference, which con-
stitutes discriminatory intent_l07 
IV. STANDARDS OF LIABILITY FOR PEER SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
The issue of intent is closely tied to the determination of the 
applicable standard of liability for sexual harassment gener-
ally. Which standard is applicable, under Title IX though, has 
not been quite as clear-cut in cases of student to student sexual 
harassment. 
In the Title IX hostile environment sexual harassment 
cases, proof of intent may be inferred from the totality of cir-
cumstances108 or from "cumulative evidence of action and inac-
tion which objectively manifests discriminatory intent."109 
While courts readily accept that intentional discrimination is 
required in Title IX hostile environment sexual harassment 
cases to hold school districts liable, it was not settled, prior to 
1999, what was required to prove an intent to discriminate in 
107. See Haines v. Metropolitan Gov't of Davidson County, 32 F. Supp. 2d 991 
(M.D. Tenn. 1998). 
108. See Burrow v. Postville Community Sch. Dist., 929 F. Supp. 1193, 1205 (N.D. 
Iowa 1996) ("including evidence of the school's failure to prevent or stop the sexual 
harassment despite actual knowledge of the sexually harassing behavior of students 
over whom the school exercised some degree of control."). 
109. Bosley v. Kearney R-1 Sch. Dist., 904 F. Supp. 1006, 1020 (W.D. Mo. 1995). 
Jennifer Bosley and other female students were sexually harassed by male students. 
Bosley asserted that the school district failed to protect the female students from sex-
ual harassment and discrimination and therefore, had intentionally discriminated 
against her by excluding her from participation in a federally funded program. 
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Title IX cases. 110 That raised the question of what standard of 
liability should be applied to hostile environment sexual har-
assment cases, particularly cases of student to student sexual 
harassment. 
A. Application of Title VI Standard in Title IX Cases 
The Title VI standard is known as the "intentional dis-
crimination" or "strict liability" standard. As applied to student 
sexual harassment cases arising under Title IX, this standard 
requires proof that the school district had actual or construc-
tive111 knowledge of the harassing behavior; and that despite 
that knowledge, school officials took no action to remedy the 
sexual harassment. 112 This standard differs from the Title VII 
standard on the element of notice. The Title VI standard is fre-
quently interpreted to require actual knowledge of sexual har-
assment.113 But some courts have required victims of sexual 
harassment to establish that, in addition to actual knowledge 
of harassment, the school district intentionally failed to act to 
stop the harassment.114 
The two-pronged Title VI standard is meant to hold institu-
tions liable only where it is clear that the institution had direct 
knowledge of the illegal conduct, and further, participated in 
the illegal conduct by purposely (or intentionally) taking no ac-
tion to stop the misconduct. Where sexual harassment is perpe-
trated by a student against another student, it is difficult to 
prove that the school district had actual knowledge of the har-
110. See Wright v. Mason City Community Sch. Dist., 940 F. Supp. 1412 (N.D. 
Iowa 1996). A female student was verbally harassed by other female students after she 
had been raped by her ex-boyfriend. The question in this case was whether a student 
could recover damages from a school district for its failure to stop sexual harassment of 
which they were aware and whether that failure to remedy constituted intentional dis· 
crimination by the school district. 
111. The constructive knowledge standard is also referred to as the knew or should 
have known standard. 
112. See Nelson v. Almont Community Sch., 931 F. Supp. 1345 (E.D. Mich. 1996); 
Oona v. Santa Rosa City Sch., 890 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. Cal. 1995); Howard v. Board of 
Educ., 876 F. Supp. 959 (N.D. Ill. 1995); Letlow v. Evans, 857 F. Supp. 676 (W.D. Mo. 
1994); Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1560 (N.D. Cal. 1993); Floyd v. 
Waiters, 831 F. Supp. 867 (M.D. Ga. 1993); R. L. R. v. Prague Pub. Sch. Dist. I-103, 838 
F. Supp. 1526 (W.D. Okla. 1993). 
113. See Bruneau v. South Kortright Cent. Sch. Dist., 935 F. Supp. 162, 169-174 
(N.D.N.Y 1996) (holding that constructive notice is insufficient to establish school dis-
trict liability). 
114. See Wright v. Mason City Community Sch. Dist., 940 F. Supp 1412 (N.D. Iowa 
1996). 
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assment because no employee, over whom the school district 
has supervisory authority, has sexually discriminated against a 
student. 
Before 1997, the Title VI standard was rarely invoked in 
sexual harassment cases occurring in the school setting. Then 
in 1997, several courts had the opportunity to consider what 
standard of liability should be applied in Title IX student to 
student sexual harassment cases. 115 The courts had to deter-
mine if the requisite level of intent was present to justify 
holding a school district liable for the misconduct. In those 
cases, courts began to back away from the predominant view 
that Title VII standards governed the Title IX sexual harass-
ment cases. Two significant opinions suggest that a new stan-
dard will be applied in future Title IX student to student sexual 
harassment cases. Those cases will be discussed in detail in the 
final section. 116 
B. Application of Title VII Principles to Title IX Cases 
Many of the courts responding to student to student sexual 
harassment have applied Title VII principles in Title IX cases 
because they believed they were following Franklin and Meri-
tor.l17 This reliance on Franklin and Meritor has been criti-
cized in recent cases, 118 primarily because Title VII is aimed at 
discrimination in the workplace, not discrimination against 
students. Title VII controls the employer/employee relationship 
with regard to sex discrimination based on agency principles. 
Recently courts have agreed that the Title VII standard has no 
applicability in student to student sexual harassment cases be-
cause there is no agency relationship between the student har-
115. See Rosa H. v. San Elisario, Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 648, 656 (5th Cir. 
1997); Smith v. Metropolitan Sch. Dist., 128 F.3d 1014 (7th Cir. 1997); Davis v. Monroe 
County Sch. Bd., 120 F. 3d 1390 (11th Cir. 1997). 
116. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999); Gebser v. Lago 
Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998). 
117. See Wright v. Mason City Community Sch. Dist., 940 F. Supp. 1412 (N.D. 
Iowa 1996); Bruneau v. South Kortright Cent. Sch. Dist., 935 F. Supp. 162 (N.D.N.Y. 
1996); Nelson v. Almont Community Sch. Dist., 931 F. Supp. 1345 (E.D. Mich. 1996); 
Burrow v. Postville Sch. Dist., 929 F. Supp. 1193 (N.D. Iowa 1996); Linson v. Trustees 
of the Univ. of Pa., No. 95-3681, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12243 (E.D. Pa. August 21, 
1996). 
118. See Doe v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 1223 (5th Cir. 1997); Nicole 
M. v. Martinez Unified Sch. Dist., 964 F. Supp. 1369 (N.D. Cal. 1997); Burrow v. Post-
ville Community Sch. Dist., 929 F. Supp. 1193 (N.D. Iowa 1996). 
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asser and school officials upon which school district liability 
could be based_l19 Yet Title VII principles have guided the law 
in this area in recent years. 
Meritor, and later Franklin, helped pave the way to our 
current understanding of the parameters of a Title VII viola-
tion. From Meritor came the language, "discrimination based 
on sex," 120 which helped us understand what behavior "cre-
ate[s] a hostile or abusive work environment."121 In Franklin, 
the Supreme Court extended the reach of the Meritor language 
when it applied the "discrimination based on sex"122 require-
ment to incidents of "sexual harassment of a student by a 
teacher." 123 Meritor also has been applied to cases of peer sex-
ual harassment in the workplace, 124 while Franklin has been 
extended to include student to student sexual harassment. 125 
119. See Smith v. Metropolitan Sch. Dist., 128 F.3d 1014, 1023 (7th Cir. 1997) ("Ti· 
tie IX prohibits recipients of funds for a 'program or activity' from discriminating on 
the basis of sex, while Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating on the basis of 
sex .... " ld at 1027); Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 120 F.3d 1390, 1396 (11th 
Cir. 1997) ("The term 'hostile environment' sexual harassment originated in employ-
ment litigation under section 703 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Public Law No. 88· 
352, 78 STAT. 241, 255 (1964) (Codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000 E-2 (1994))("Title VII"). 
Hostile-environment sexual harassment occurs whenever an employee's speech or con· 
duct creates an atmosphere that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter another em· 
ployee's working conditions."); Doe v. Londonderry Sch. Dist., 970 F. Supp. 64, 72 
(D.N.H. 1997) ("In at least one case of a student-employee who was harassed, the first 
circuit has concluded that Title VII principles apply to Title IX cases. See Lipsett, 864 
F.2d at 896-97. However, in that case the circuit explicitly limited its ruling to the facts 
before it and gave no indication that its analysis could be extended to other Title IX 
cases absent an employer-employee relationship." Citing Lipsett v. University of P.R., 
864 F.2d 881, 897 (1st Cir. 1988)). 
120. Meritor Savs. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986). 
121. ld. 
122. ld. 
123. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 75 (1992). 
124. See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991). Ellison is a Title VII co-
worker sexual harassment case where a male employee persistently pursued a per-
sonal relationship with a female co-worker over her objections. There were two ques-
tions raised in this case. First, the court had to determine the appropriate test to de-
termine when "conduct is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter conditions of 
employment and create a hostile working environment." Id. at 873. Second, what re-
medial actions can an employer take to shield itself from liability. 
125. See Nicole M. v. Martinez Unified Sch. Dist., 964 F. Supp. 1369, 1375 (N.D. 
Cal 1997). "[T]he Franklin court turned to Title VII Jaw to determine what standard 
should apply to Title IX sexual harassment claims. The court held: 'unquestionably, 
Title IX placed on [defendant school system] the duty not to discriminate on the basis 
of sex, and 'when a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate because of the subordi-
nate's sex, that supervisor 'discriminate[s]' on the basis of sex.' Quoting Meritor Savs. 
Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986).' We believe the same rule should apply 
when a teacher sexually harasses a student." Id. (quoting Franklin v. Gwinnett County 
47] SAME-GENDER SEXUAL HARASSMENT 73 
From the Title VII case law came the notion of employer li-
ability when the employer "knew or should have known" of the 
sexually harassing behavior, and the employer fails "to take 
steps reasonably calculated to end the harassment."126 In Ni-
cole M. u. Martinez Unified School District, 127 a California dis-
trict court added to the confusion over the applicability of Title 
VII principles to Title IX cases when the court stated that the 
"knew or should have known" standard is consistent with 
"Pennhurst's explanation of the contractual nature of Spending 
Clause legislation, Justice White's opinion in Guardians and 
the Franklin decision." 128 The California court seems to com-
bine Title VI and Title VII standards in Nicole M. with the 
court's reliance on Pennhurst 129 and Spending Clause legisla-
tion to explain the Title VII "knew or should have known" 
standard. Ultimately, the court held that "Title IX does not im-
pose liability on school districts for peer hostile environment 
sexual harassment 'absent allegations that the school district 
itself directly discriminated based on sex."'130 The Nicole M. 
test requires proof "that an employee who has been invested by 
the school board with supervisory power over the offending 
employee actually knew of the abuse, had the power to end the 
abuse, and failed to do so."131 
It appears that Nicole M. would extend Title VII agency 
principles to cases of peer sexual harassment between stu-
dents. This would hold school district officials liable for peer to 
peer sexual harassment where school officials had been notified 
of the harassing conduct. The court extended the agency rela-
tionship found in the employment context to the relationship 
between teacher and school district in peer sexual harassment 
cases involving students. The Nicole M. court explained: 
Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 75 (1992)). Reworded to apply to students it would read: When 
[one student] sexually harasses [another student] because of the [student's] sex, that 
[student] discriminate[s] on the basis of sex. 
126. Nicole M., 964 F. Supp. at 1376 (citing Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d. 872, 881-82 
(9th Cir. 1991); See also Davis v. Monroe County Bd. ofEduc., 74 F.3d 1186, 1193 (11th 
Cir. 1996) vacated, pending reh'g en bane, 91 F.3d 1418 (11th Cir. 1996). 
127. !d. at 1369. 
128. !d. at 1378 (both Pennhnrst and Guardians were Title VI cases while Frank-
lin was a Title IX case). 
129. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hasp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984). 
130. Nicole M., 964 F. Supp. at 1376 (quoting Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 
80 F.3d 1006, 1008 (5th Cir. 1996). 
131. !d. at 1377 (quoting Rosa H. v. San Elizario Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 648, 
650 (5th Cir. 1997). 
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A teacher whose agency status is sufficient to hold the district 
liable for her harassment of a student, which was the case in 
Franklin, stands in no different position when she knows, or 
should be on notice with the exercise of reasonable care, of 
peer sexual harassment. Given the relationship of teachers to 
students and the duties that inhere in that relationship, this 
is a reasonable application of Franklin.132 
Title VII principles have been applied to sexual harassment 
cases arising in the school context. Until recently, factors gen-
erated by the Eleventh Circuit in Davis133 have been applied to 
determine school district liability. 134 The five factors defined in 
Davis represented a compilation of existing Title VII guidelines 
used to determine if hostile environment sexual harassment 
existed in the workplace. In Davis, the district court applied 
those factors to determine if the harassing conduct established 
proof of intentional misconduct by school districts in violation 
ofTitle IX. 
The first factor, "she belongs to a protected group," 135 is a 
preliminary question to ensure that the victim actually falls 
within the protection of Title IX. The second factor, "she was 
subject to unwelcome sexual harassment," 136 as well as the 
third factor, "the harassment was based on sex" are both de-
rived from Meritor Savings Bank FSB v. Vinson. 137 The second 
factor requires the victim to show that the sexual conduct was 
not welcome. This is not difficult to prove when the harasser is 
a teacher and the victim is a student, unless the student is in 
high school and there is evidence that both teacher and student 
took steps to conceal the relationship. 138 It is less difficult to 
132. !d. at 1378. 
133. 74 F.3d 1186 (11th Cir. 1996). 
134. !d. at 1194 ("1) Plaintiff is a member of a protected group; 2) Plaintiff was 
subject to unwelcome harassment; 3) harassment was based on sex; 4) sexual harass-
ment was sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to unreasonably alter the conditions of 
her education and create an abusive educational environment; 5) some basis for insti-
tutional liability has been established.") See also Wright v. Mason City Community 
Sch. Dist., 940 F. Supp 1412, 1419-1420 (N.D. Iowa 1996) (In Wright, the court added 
the following to the existing fifth factor: "and intentionally failed to take the proper 
remedial measures because of the plaintiffs sex." 940 F. Supp. at 1419); Bosley v. 
Kearney R-1 Sch. Dist., 904 F. Supp. 1006, 1022-1023 (W.D. Mo. 1995) (The Bosley 
court changed the fifth factor to read: "The defendant knew or should have known of 
harassment and failed to take proper remedial action." 904 F. Supp. at 1022-23.). 
135. Harris v. Forklift, 510 U.S. 17 (1993). 
136. Dauis, 74 F. 3d at 1194. 
137. 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
138. See Smith v. Metropolitan Sch. Dist., 128 F.3d 1014 (7th Cir. 1997); Marsh v. 
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show the unwelcomeness of sexual conduct when both harasser 
and victim are students, particularly when the behavior inter-
feres with the victim's ability to participate in the educational 
environment. This is especially true when the behavior inter-
feres with the victim's ability to participate in the educational 
environment. 
The factor that has created the most uncertainty is the 
third factor: "the harassment was based on sex." Some courts 
have required victims to show that the school district treated 
boys differently than it treated girls. 139 But this interpretation 
has been criticized by some courts that have adopted a less re-
strictive interpretation of intent. For example, one district 
court concluded that "to be held liable, a school district must 
have intended to create a hostile environment for the plain-
tiff."140 
The fourth Davis factor incorporates the Harris v. Forklift 
requirement that the harassing conduct must be "sufficiently 
severe or pervasive so as to alter conditions of her educa-
tion."141 This factor protects the institution from liability when 
the harassing conduct is not so serious as to interfere with the 
victim's education. This factor is explicitly designed to protect 
school districts from liability for "simple horseplay" 142 that 
merely annoys the victim. 
The fifth Davis factor requires the victim to show "that 
some basis of institutional liability" exists. 143 The Davis court 
clearly intended to apply the Title VII agency standard of li-
ability under Title IX with the adoption of the fifth (basis of in-
stitutionalliability). As applied, the fifth Davis factor requires 
Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 3:94-CV-2255-R, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4819 (N.D. Tex. 
March 10, 1997); Kimpton v. School Dist. of New Lisbon, 138 Wis.2d 226 (Wis. App. 
1987). 
139. See Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F. 3d 1006, 1016 (5th Cir. 1996). 
140. Doe v. Londonderry Sch. Dist., 970 F. Supp. 64, 74 (D.N.H. 1997). See also 
Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 949 F. Supp. 1415, 1421 (N.D. Cal. 1996); Burrow v. 
Postville Community Sch. Dist., 929 F. Supp 1193, 1205 (N.D. Iowa 1996). 
141. Harris v. Forklift, 510 U.S. 17, 18 (1993). See also Kinman v. Omaha Sch. 
Dist., 94 F.3d 463, 468 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226, 1232 
(lOth Cir. 1996)). 
142. Bruneau v. South Kortright Cent. Sch. Dist., 935 F. Supp. 162, 175 (N.D.N.Y. 
1996). See also Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 575, cert. granted, vacated 118 S. 
Ct 1183 (1998); McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F. 3d 1191, 1199 
(4th Cir. 1996) (Michael, J., dissenting). 
143. Kinman v. Omaha Sch. Dist., 94 F.3d 463, 468 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing Seamons 
v. Snow, 84 F. 3d 1226, 1232 (lOth Cir. 1996)). 
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that the school district: "a) knew or should have known of the 
harassment; and b) failed to take prompt remedial action."l44 
From 1993 through 1996, many lower courts struggled to 
define the standard of liability that should be imposed on 
school districts for peer sexual harassment. The growing trend 
was to move away from the Title VI strict liability standard re-
quiring either actual knowledge of sexual harassment or a hos-
tile environment to prove intentional discrimination by a school 
district, 145 in favor of the two-pronged, Title VII approach re-
quiring that an employer or officials of an institution "knew or 
should have known of the sexual harassment and failed to take 
remedial action."l46 
The problem with the Title VII standard, despite the ap-
parent clarity of the Davis factors, is that Title VII was adopted 
as a means of combating employment discrimination. Adoption 
of the "knew or should have known" standard, while a seem-
ingly appropriate application of Title VII principles in Title IX 
sexual harassment cases to determine school officials' intent to 
discriminate against victims of sexual harassment, has re-
cently been challenged in a series of cases.147 The Title VII 
standard is inapplicable to Title IX cases, according to recent 
courts, because Title VII liability depends on an agency rela-
tionship between the institution and the victim and/or the har-
asser. That agency relationship does not exist in student to 
student sexual harassment cases primarily because there is no 
relationship between the school district and the harasser such 
that the school district could have notice of the sexual harass-
ment or hostile environment arising from an institu-
tion/harasser relationship. The harasser does not act on behalf 
of the school district or in the scope of any employment. There-
fore, there is no basis for liability against the school district. 
The end result is that those courts that have carefully 
looked at the legislative history of Title VII have concluded 
144. Burrow v. Postville Community Sch. Dist., 929 F. Supp. 1193 (N.D. Iowa 
1996); See Nicole v. Martinez Unified Sch. Dist., 964 F. Supp. 1369, 1376 (N. D. Cal. 
1997). 
145. See Id.; Nelson v. Almont Community Scb., 931 F. Supp. 1345, 1355 (E.D. 
Mich. 1996); Bolon v. Rolla Pub. Sch., 917 F. Supp. 1423, 1427 (E.D. Mo. 1996). 
146. Id.; Nelson v. Almont Community Sch., 931 F. Supp. 1345 (E.D. Mich. 1996); 
Pallett v. Palma, 914 F. Supp. 1018, 1021 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
147. See Rosa H. v. San Elizario Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 648, 655-656 (5th Cir. 
1997); Smith v. Metropolitan Sch. Dist., 128 F.3d 1014, 1033-34 (7th Cir. 1997); Davis 
v. Monroe County Bd. ofEduc., 120 F.3d 1390 (11th Cir. 1997). 
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that Title VII principles do not apply to school districts for stu-
dent to student sexual harassment. This conclusion calls into 
question all of the rulings that have applied the Title VII stan-
dard to cases of peer sexual harassment between students. It 
also opens the door for other courts to reconsider the whole no-
tion of school district liability for student to student sexual 
harassment. 
V. SAME-GENDER SEXUAL HARASSMENT BETWEEN PEERS: A 
NEW DIRECTION 
Arguments against application of the Title VII standard in 
Title IX sexual harassment cases have resurfaced with new 
strength in the last two years. 148 Two cases, in particular, 
comprehensively analyze why the application of the Title VII 
standard in student to student sexual harassment cases is in-
appropriate and imposes an undue burden on school dis-
tricts.149 At the core of this new line of cases is the proposition 
that Title IX differs significantly from Title VII such that ap-
plication of Title VII agency principles to Title IX cases cannot 
be supported by the legislative histories of either statute. 
The shift began in earnest with Rosa H. v. San Elizario In-
dependent School District. 150 In Rosa H., the Fifth Circuit re-
jected the agency theory of liability (or vicarious liability)151 in 
favor of the stricter "actual knowledge" standard. But the court 
added a new element. Under Rosa H. "school districts are not 
liable in tort for teacher-student harassment under Title IX 
unless an employee who has been invested by the school board 
with supervisory power over the offending employee actually 
knew of the abuse, had the power to end the abuse, and failed to 
148. See Rosa H. v. San Elizario Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 648 (5th Cir. 1997); 
Smith v. Metropolitan Sch. Dist., 128 F.3d 1014 (7th Cir. 1997); Davis v. Monroe 
County Bd. of Educ., 120 F.3d 1390 (11th Cir. 1997); Floyd v. Waiters, 831 F. Supp. 
867, 876 (M.D. Ga. 1993). 
149. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 120 F.3d 1390 (11th Cir. 1997); 
Smith v. Metropolitan Sch. Dist., 128 F.3d 1014 (7th Cir. 1997). 
150. 106 F.3d 648 (5th Cir. 1997) (involving teacher to student sexual harassment 
under Title IX. The question here was whether a school district could be held liable for 
its failure to prevent teacher to student sexual harassment.). 
151. See also Doe v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 1223 (5th Cir. 1997) 
("Common law rule is that an employer is vicariously liable for the tort of an employee, 
even if the tort was outside of the scope of employment, if the employee 'was aided in 
accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relationship."' Quoting Restate-
ment (Second) of Agency§ 219(2) (d) (1958)). 
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do so."152 The Fifth Circuit rejected the common law agency 
theory of liability for teacher to student harassment in Rosa H. 
and then further retreated from the Title VII agency theory of 
liability in Doe v. Lago Vista Independent School District, 153 
stating that "[w]e follow Rosa H. and refuse to allow plaintiffs 
to use Title IX which was enacted under the Spending Clause, 
to bring suits based on the mere fact that a teacher's employ-
ment status aided in the commission of sexual harassment."154 
The Fifth Circuit again took the lead in shaping the law in the 
sexual harassment arena with these two cases. Doe v. Lago 
Vista Independent School District marked a return to the dis-
cussion of the proper basis upon which liability for sexual har-
assment should rest. It also marked a return to a discussion of 
the legislative intent behind Title IX. That led, ultimately, to 
the Fifth Circuit's conclusion in Davis v. Monroe County Board 
of Education that "Title IX is virtually identical to Title VI." 155 
But the court refused to impose liability for student to student 
harassment because "Congress gave no clear notice to schools 
and teachers that they, rather than society as a whole, would 
accept responsibility for remedying student-student sexual 
harassment when they chose to accept federal financial assis-
tance under Title IX." 156 The lack of notice, coupled with the 
absence of any connection between the school and the actions of 
the student harasser, compelled courts to absolve school dis-
tricts of liability for peer sexual harassment between students. 
In August 1997, the Seventh Circuit continued the discus-
sion of school district liability for student to student sexual 
harassment under Title IX. In Smith v. Metropolitan School 
District, 157 the Seventh Circuit explained, "while Title VII and 
Title IX both prohibit sexual harassment as a form of sex dis-
152. Rosa H., 106 F.3d at 650 (emphasis added). 
153. 106 F.3d 1223 (5th Cir. 1997). 
154. ld. at 1226. 
155. Davis, 120 F. 3d at 1398. 
156. Id. at 1406. 
157. 128 F.3d 1014 (7th Cir. 1997). This is a Title IX case where a student sought 
damages against the school district for discrimination based on sex stemming from a 
sexual affair between a student and her teacher. The court concluded that Title VII 
provides guidance in determining "whether the alleged harassment is severe and per-
vasive enough to constitute illegal discrimination on the basis of sex for purposes of 
Title IX." I d. at 1023. The Smith Court rejected Title VII agency principles as the basis 
for the standard of liability applicable to instances of institutional discrimination based 
on sex. The court adopted the actual knowledge standard set forth in Rosa H. v. San 
Elizario Independent School District, 106 F. 3d 648 (5th Cir. 1997). 
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crimination, the statutes differ as to who is prohibited from en-
gaging in that conduct." 158 The court went on to compare the 
language of the two statutes to determine if Congress intended 
Title VII to guide the application of Title IX in sexual harass-
ment cases. A fundamental difference between Title VII and 
Title IX is that "Title VII prohibits employers from discrimi-
nating on the basis of sex," 159 while "Title IX prohibits recipi-
ents of funds for a 'program or activity' from discriminating on 
the basis of sex." 16° 
In Meritor, the Supreme Court held that agency principles 
apply to Title VII "because the statutes at issue explicitly de-
fine an employee to include agents of the employer, evincing 
Congress' intent to hold employers liable vicariously." 161 As a 
result, the Meritor Court concluded that "the 'any agent' lan-
guage of Title VII ... provides a statutory basis for applying 
agency principles" 162 to sexual harassment claims. 
Title IX contains no language creating a "statutory basis for 
applying agency principles."163 The language of Title IX ex-
cludes from liability employees working for a "program or ac-
tivity" and includes "only those who have administrative con-
trol of the school." 164 Clearly, teachers are excluded under this 
definition of "program or activity" because teachers don't have 
administrative control of the school. But the question often con-
fronting courts in sexual harassment cases is who has adminis-
trative control of the school? Is it the school principal, the su-
perintendent, or the school board? The typical response is that 
the school board has administrative control of the school. 165 
Therefore, unless a victim can prove that the school board has 
either actual or constructive knowledge of sexual harassment 
and then fails to take remedial action, the school board will not 
be held liable for sexual harassment that occurs in public 
schools. If this new approach to the standard of liability, based 
158. Smith, 128 F.3d at 1023 (emphasis added). 
159. Id. 
160. Id. 




165. See Karen Michaelis, Theories of Liability for the Sexual Misconduct of Teach-
ers, VOL 6. No. 5 J. SCH. LEADERSHIP 540-554 (Sept. 1996) for a discussion of which 
school officials must have knowledge of abuse and fail to act for liability to attach to 
school districts in teacher sexual abuse cases. 
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on Title VI principles, becomes the accepted approach in peer 
sexual harassment cases, 166 and Title IX restricts liability only 
to "the acts of the recipients of federal funds," 167 then student 
victims of peer sexual harassment will be unable to seek dam-
ages against a school district for its failure to prevent or stop 
student to student sexual harassment. 168 
In light of the almost identical language of Title VI and Ti-
tle IX, coupled with the recent emphasis on using the legisla-
tive history of Title VI to determine the correct standard under 
Title IX; it is likely that the element of institutional notice not 
only will become more central in determining the standard of 
school district liability, but it will also completely foreclose ap-
plication of Title VII agency principles in Title IX cases. This 
will further insulate school districts from liability for student to 
student sexual harassment. 169 The result is not far from be-
coming reality. 
VI. RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISIONS: ONCALE, GEBSER, 
AND DAVIS 
A. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc. 
Recently, the Supreme Court recognized a private cause of 
166. It appears that the Supreme Court has adopted this approach in Gebser u. 
Lago Vista Independent School District, 524 U.S. 274 (1998) and Davis u. Monroe 
County Board of Education, 120 F.3d 1390 (11th Cir. 1997). 
167. Smith v. Metropolitan Sch. Dist. Perry Township, 128 F.3d 1014, 1026 (7th 
Cir. 1997) (quoting Rosa H. v. San Elizario Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 648, 654 (5th 
Cir. 1997). 
168. Students will not have recourse under Title IX for student to student sexual 
harassment unless courts consider the inaction of recipients of federal funds as dis-
criminatory conduct thereby attaching liability to school districts for their own conduct 
in ignoring sexual harassment by third parties. See Haines v. Metropolitan Gov't of 
Davidson County, 32 F. Supp. 2d 991, 998 (M.D. Tenn. 1998) ("writing the four-person 
dissent, Judge Barkett [in Davis] rejected the reasoning of ,Judge Tjoflat's majority 
opinion, concluding that Title IX provides unambiguous notice to recipients of federal 
funds that they many be liable for failing to remedy the sexual harassment of one stu-
dent by other students") (citing Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 120 F. 3d 1390, 
1412 (11th Cir. 1997) (Barkett, J., dissenting)). 
169. Title IX liability for student to student sexual harassment requires a link be-
tween the school district and the harasser. "[Tjhe policy concerns involved in Spending 
Clause legislation compel the conclusion that agency principles have no place in Title 
IX litigation because 'there is nothing to give notice to the recipient of federal funds 
that the funds carry the strings of such liability."' Smith, 128 F.3d at 1031 (quoting 
Rosa H. v. San Elizario Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F. 3d 648, 656 (5th Cir 1997)). 
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action under Title VII for same-gender sexual harassment be-
tween co-workers. In Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, 
Inc., 170 the Supreme Court had the opportunity to consider the 
issue of employer liability in a same-gender sexual harassment 
case. The Court concluded that under Title VII agency princi-
ples, the acts of an employee may be imputed to the employer 
where the employer had notice of the sexual harassment and 
failed to prevent or stop the behavior creating the hostile envi-
ronment. The Court clearly demonstrated the link in Oncale 
between the harassing behavior and the employer's responsi-
bility to maintain a nondiscriminatory workplace. The Court 
also made clear that Title VII applies to sexual harassment in 
the workplace. While this decision is important because it clari-
fies, at least for adult co-workers that same-gender sexual har-
assment between peers is actionable under Title VII, it leaves 
unanswered the question whether a student victim of peer-
inflicted sexual harassment may recover damages from a 
school district. The Oncale decision also raises a question re-
garding the Supreme Court's intent to create different stan-
dards for sexual harassment between adult co-workers and 
sexual harassment between students. 
In Oncale, the Court seemed to have provided a way for 
lower courts to avoid attaching liability to school districts for 
student to student sexual harassment while providing a clear 
message that employers may be held liable under Title VII for 
same-gender peer sexual harassment between co-workers. 
Therefore, adult workers would be protected from their co-
workers' sexual harassment, while students would continue to 
have no remedy against the school district where student to 
student harassment occurs. While this result is the logical con-
clusion of the statutory analysis of Titles VI, VII, and IX, its 
practical application is bound to leave many parents and stu-
dents baffled and angry that Title VII would protect adult vic-
tims of same-gender, peer sexual harassment, but not student 
victims of same-gender, peer sexual harassment. 
B. Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District 
Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District171 illus-
trates the Court's willingness to abandon the Title VII stan-
170. 523 U.S. 75 (1998). 
171. 524 U.S. 274 (1998). 
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dard relied on by lower courts to determine school district li-
ability for sexual harassment. This shift clarifies the standard 
of liability for sexual harassment in the workplace outside of 
educational institutions. It also clarifies the standard of liabil-
ity for sexual harassment in schools. Moreover, this shift aligns 
the rationale for applying the Title VI standard in school sex-
ual harassment cases with the legislative history of Title IX re-
cently analyzed in student to student sexual harassment cases. 
This shift also retains the Title VII standard for sexual har-
assment perpetrated by a school district employee against an-
other employee, but not where an employee sexually harasses a 
student. In an unusual move, the Supreme Court concluded 
that even teacher to student sexual harassment will be gov-
erned by the Title VI standard.l72 
Yet to be answered is the question, what are the limits of 
liability? The answer to this question hinges on the notice and 
action elements already explored extensively in earlier sexual 
harassment cases applying Title VII or Section 1983 standards. 
Specifically, school district liability will depend on a) what con-
stitutes sufficient notice to the school district that peer sexual 
harassment is occurring; and b) what action is the school dis-
trict required to take to end the harassment. 173 
In Gebser, the Supreme Court articulated a new standard of 
liability based on the stricter Title VI standard. There the 
Court stated: 
[D]amages may not be recovered [from a school district based 
on sexual harassment of a student by one of its teachers] un-
less an official of the school district who at a minimum has 
172. See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist, 524 U.S. 274 (1998) (concluding 
that "it would 'frustrate the purposes' of Title IX to permit a damages recovery against 
a school district for a teacher's sexual harassment of a student based on principles of 
respondeat superior or constructive notice.") (quoting Franklin v. Gwinnett County 
Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 71 (1992); See also Smith v. Metropolitan Sch. Dist. Township, 
128 F.3d 1014, 1027 (7th Cir. 1997) ("rejecting agency standard of institutional liability 
in Title IX cases") (quoting Morse v. Regents of the U niv. of Colo., 154 F.3d 1124, 1127 
(lOth Cir. 1998)). 
173. See Haines v. Metropolitan Gov't of Davidson County, 32 F. Supp. 2d 991 
(M.D. Tenn. 1998). A female student was sexually harassed and sexually abused by two 
male students at school. The female student sought damages from the school board for 
their failure to stop the harassment. The court applied the recently adopted Gebser 
standard limiting a damage remedy under Title IX to cases where "an official who at a 
minimum has authority to address the alleged discrimination and to institute correc-
tive measures on the recipient's behalf has actual knowledge of discrimination in the 
recipient's programs and fails adequately to respond." ld. at 999 (quoting Gebser v. 
Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 292 (1998). 
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authority to institute corrective measures on the district's be-
half has actual notice of, and is deliberately indifferent to, the 
teacher's misconduct_l74 
83 
The higher standard for teacher to student sexual harass-
ment does not square with the rationale offered by the Court 
justifying Title VI as the appropriate standard in the educa-
tional institution when the school district is governed by the 
lower Title VII standard for employee-employee sexual har-
assment because of the agency relationship between the dis-
trict and the perpetrator. That agency relationship does not 
disappear when the victim is a student. The result, however, is 
to make it even more difficult for students to establish school 
district liability even where teachers are the perpetrators. 
The Gebser standard severely restricts a student's ability to 
recover damages from a school district, particularly in cases 
where the student alleges that the school district failed to pro-
tect the student from sexual harassment inflicted by another 
student. Post-Gebser courts will have to help clarify the compo-
nents of the Gebser standard. As it stands, it is not clear which 
school officials have "authority to institute corrective measures 
on the district's behal£."175 Additionally, it is not clear if that 
authority is something more than simply being an employee of 
the school district who knows the chain of command for re-
porting such things as child abuse and sexual harassment.l76 
The notice element of the Gebser standard will continue to be 
debated. The questions are, how many reports of sexual har-
assment are necessary to establish actual notice, and which of-
ficial of the school district must be informed in order to satisfy 
the actual notice prong? 
The real surprise in Gebser was the adoption of the deliber-
ate indifference element from Section 1983, first mentioned in 
Nicole M., to the Gebser standard. Deliberate indifference has 
created problems in Section 1983 cases in two ways. First, how 
much action is enough to indicate that a school district is at-
tempting to resolve a sexual harassment complaint? Second, 
174. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 284. 
175. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 284. 
176. See Haines, 32 F. Supp. 2d at 999 (noting that child abuse reporting statutes 
make teachers mandatory reporters of suspected child abuse, but courts considering 
school district liability for sexual harassment by another student or even a teacher 
have been reluctant to conclude that a classroom teacher is vested with sufficient 
authority to "institute corrective measures") (quoting Gebser, 524 U.S. at 284). 
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how effective must the action be, if at all, to overcome a charge 
of deliberate indifference? To date, there are no definitive an-
swers to either of these questions. 
Further, as the stricter Title VI standard is applied to 
same-gender sexual harassment cases where both harasser and 
victim are students, the conflict between the current state of 
the law and the expectation held by parents and students that 
school officials will protect students from sexual harassment 
will lead to more conflict over who will be held liable for the 
damage caused by hostile environment sexual harassment in 
public schools. 
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Davis, several is-
sues remained unresolved concerning a school district's poten-
tial for liability in cases of student to student sexual harass-
ment.177 First, would the Court recognize a private cause of 
action for student to student sexual harassment? And second, if 
a cause of action were recognized, what standard of liability 
would be imposed on school districts for student to student 
sexual harassment? The recent movement away from the Title 
VII standard by lower courts indicated a growing acceptance of 
Title VI as the appropriate standard of liability in Title IX 
cases. Prior to Gebser, it was not clear that the Supreme Court 
would agree with that emerging minority view in determining 
school district liability for student to student sexual harass-
ment. However, one of the remaining issues sure to cause de-
bate concerns a determination of which school officials "ha[ve] 
authority to institute corrective measures on the district's be-
half."178 Some have argued recently that a classroom teacher 
should be considered to have such authority when a student is 
victimized by another student. 179 
177. The Supreme Court's decision in Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, 
526 U.S. 629 (1999), addressed several of the questions that had been debated among 
the lower courts without definitive resolution. The Davis decision has laid to rest the 
debate over the existence of a private cause of action for student to student sexual har-
assment holding that there is a private cause of action for student to student sexual 
harassment. The Court also identified the appropriate standard of liability under Title 
IX for student to student sexual harassment when it adopted the Title VI standard. I d. 
178. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 284 (1998). 
179. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytech Inst., 132 F.3d 949, 958 (4th Cir. 1997), 
reh'g en bane granted, vacated (Feb. 5, 1998); Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 
F.3d 1006, 1015 (5th Cir.) cert. Denied, 519 U.S. 861 (1996); Kinman v. Omaha Pub. 
Sch. Dist., 94 F.3d 463, 467-68 (8th Cir. 1996); Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226, 1232 
(lOth Cir. 1996); Brown v. Hot, Sexy and Safer Productions, Inc., 68 F. 3d 525, 540 (1st 
Cir. 1995); See also Oona v. McCaffrey, 143 F.3d 473, 476 (9th Cir 1998); Doe v. Clai-
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Several post-Gebser cases have adopted the stricter Gebser 
Title VI standard in both teacher to student and student to 
student sexual harassment cases. 180 But, despite Gebser, ques-
tions remain. One issue sure to occupy the courts for some time 
concerns the circumstances under which school districts will be 
held liable for sexual harassment under Title IX, particularly 
when the harasser is not an employee of the school district. 
During 1998, before and after Gebser was decided, several 
lower courts considered the scope and meaning of Title IX in 
cases of student to student sexual harassment. 181 Those courts 
agreed with Judge Barkett's dissent in the Eleventh Circuit's 
decision in Davis182 "that Title IX authorizes a cause of action 
for student-on-student sexual harassment."183Further, the 
Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits agree that while employ-
ers and school officials cannot be held "vicariously liable for the 
actions of others,"184 all three circuits agree that Title IX im-
poses on educational institutions the duty to maintain an edu-
cational environment free of discrimination. As such, the edu-
cational institution would be required to "safeguardO 
individual students' rights."l85 
borne County Tenn., 103 F.3d 495, 515 (6th Cir. 1996) (noting "the elements to state a 
supervisory hostile environment claim under Title VII equally apply to Title IX"); 
Murray v. New York Univ. College of Dentistry, 57 F.3d 243, 248 (2d Cir. 1995) ("using 
Title VII legal standards to review claim of discrimination under Title IX") (quoting 
Haines, 32 F. Supp. 2d 999); Haines v. Metropolitan Gov't of Davidson County, 32 F. 
Supp.2d 991, 999 (M.D. Tenn. 1998) ("applying Title VII standards to Title IX hostile 
environment claim"). 
1~0. See X v. Fremont County Sch. Dist., 162 F.3d 1175 (lOth Cir 1998) (noting 
that [t]he Supreme Court has ruled that Title VII's employer liability principles do not 
apply m the T1tle IX context.") (citing Gebser, 524 U.S. at 283); Morse v. Regents of the 
~mv. of Colo., 154 F.3d 1124 (lOth Cir. 1998); see also Floyd v. Waiters, 133 F.3d 78G 
( lth C1r. 1998) (pre-Gebser case adopting Title VI standard)· Smith M t r 
Sch. Dist. Perry Township, 128 F.3d 1014 1027 (7th CJ·r ,1997) (pv. Gebropo Itan d · · ' · re- e ser case 
a optmg Title VI standard); Rosa H. v. San Elizario Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 648 
(5th Clr. 1997) (pre-Gebser case adopting Title VI standard)· Davis v DeKalb c t Sch Di t 996 F s ' · oun y 
d · s ·· · upp. 1478 (N.D. Ga. 1998) (pre-Gebser case adopting Title VI stan ard). . 
181. See Haines v. Metropolitan Gov't of Davidson County, 32 F. Supp. 2d. 991 
(M.D. Tenn. 1998); Oona v. McCaffrey, 143 F.3d 473 (9th Cir. 1998)· Brzonkala v· . 
g1ma Polytech Inst., 132 F.3d 949 (4th Cir. 1997); Doe v. University ~fIll 138 F ;d 6~3 (7th Cir. 1998). ., · 
182. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 120 F.3d 1390, 1411 (11th Cir. 1997) (Barkett, J., d1ssenting). 
183. Haines, 32 F. Supp. 2d at 998 (M.D. Tenn. 1998). 
184. Id. quoting Oona, 143 F.3d at 477. 
185. Haines, 32 F. Supp. 2d at 998 (quoting North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 
U.S. 512, 521 (1982). 
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C. Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education 
The third Supreme Court decision in this recent trilogy of 
cases concerning the various forms and contexts of sexual har-
assment occurred on May 24, 1999. In Davis v. Monroe County 
Board of Education, 186 the Court addressed the issue of the 
existence of a private cause of action for student to student 
sexual harassment. The Davis decision represents the culmina-
tion in this series of Supreme Court decisions on sexual har-
assment which, in combination with the two earlier decisions, 
provides the clearest guidance to date in this area oflaw. 
In Davis, the Court answered the outstanding questions oc-
cupying the lower courts for the past decade. First, the Court 
emphasized its decision in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public 
Schools187 where the Franklin Court concluded that there is 
"an implied private right of action for money damages"188 but 
added that such damages "are available only where recipients 
of federal funding had adequate notice that they could be liable 
for the conduct at issue."189 
Next, the Court addressed the issue of school district liabil-
ity for the sexual harassment of a student by another student, 
during the school day and on school property. After reiterating 
Title IX's proscription against institutional liability for the acts 
of individuals or third parties, the Davis Court concluded that 
the plaintiff, LaShonda Davis, had properly stated a private 
cause of action against the school district. This conclusion was 
based on the district's own misconduct; namely its failure to 
take any remedial or disciplinary steps to stop the harassing 
conduct to which LaShonda Davis was subjected. As such, 
Davis's complaint sought to hold the school district liable for its 
deliberate indifference to known acts of sexual harassment, 190 
and not the acts of a private third party (i.e. the student perpe-
trator). 
The Davis Court also considered the applicability of the 
Gebser standard in cases of student to student sexual harass-
186. 526 U.S. 629 (1999). 
187. 503 U.S. 60 (1992). 
188. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999). 
189. Id. (1999) (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 17 
(1981)). 
190. See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998) (The Gebser 
standard is directed at intentional discrimination by the educational institution itself, 
not individual employees.). 
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ment. In Gebser, the Court held that liability attaches "where 
the district itself intentionally acted in clear violation of Title 
IX by remaining deliberately indifferent to acts of teacher-
student harassment of which it had actual knowledge."191 The 
question in Davis concerned whether a school district's deliber-
ate indifference to know acts of harassment amounted to an in-
tentional violation of Title IX when the harasser was a student. 
The answer to that question hinged on Title IX's notice re-
quirement, the "recipient's degree of control over the harasser 
and the environment in which the harassment occurs."192 Re-
lying on Franklin and Gebser, the Court concluded that "sexual 
harassment is a form of discrimination"193 under Title IX, and 
Title IX's proscription against harassment is clear enough both 
to meet the notice requirement in Pennhurst and to provide "a 
basis for a damages action."194 Further, Franklin and Gebser 
required the Court "to conclude that student-on-student sexual 
harassment, if sufficiently severe, can ... rise to the level of 
discrimination actionable under" Title IX.l95 
The Court, using the language of Title IX, linked the dis-
trict's duty to protect students from harassment to the protec-
tion Title IX provides students against being '"excluded from 
participation in' or 'denied the benefits of any 'educational pro-
gram or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."'196 The 
new standard of liability for student to student sexual harass-
ment is taken from the Gebser standard, but tailored to the 
unique responsibilities of school districts toward their students. 
Under the new standard, liability will attach where recipients 
of Federal fmancial assistance "are deliberately indifferent to 
sexual harassment, of which they have actual knowledge, that 
is so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it can be 
said to deprive the victims of access to the educational oppor-
tunities or benefits provided by the school."197 However, the 
Court distinguished between schools and adult workplaces. 
This distinction leaves open the question of whether the Court 
191. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999) (quoting Gebser, 





196. ld. (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 168l(a) (1972)). 
197. !d. 
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has created different standards of liability based on the setting 
in which the harassment occurs and the age of the victims and 
perpetrators. In qualifying the Davis standard, the Court gives 
the impression that it is not eager to provide the same level of 
protection to students that adults can expect after Oncale. Fur-
ther, the Court seems hesitant to clearly define the types of be-
haviors between students that constitute sexual harassment. 
Instead, the Court stated that "[d]amages are not available for 
simple acts of teasing and name-calling among school chil-
dren, ... even where these comments target differences in gen-
der."198 The Davis Court left to school administrators the task 
of drawing the line between innocent teasing and actionable 
sexual harassment. That is a task that school administrators 
are ill equipped to address. 
CONCLUSION 
The Eleventh Circuit's 1996 ruling in Davis199 created a 
framework based on Title VII principles, subsequently used by 
a number of courts200 to determine school district liability for 
hostile environment sexual harassment. But the recent ruling 
by the Eleventh Circuit in Davis v. Monroe County Board of 
Education201 has revealed an entirely new approach for stu-
dent to student sexual harassment cases, particularly those in-
volving same-gender sexual harassment. The Supreme Court's 
decision in Davis also fits well with the recent Supreme Court 
decision in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc. and ex-
tends the Gebser standard. The combination of these opinions, 
as well as a handful of other recent student to student sexual 
harassment cases, could upset the majority of existing student 
to student sexual harassment rulings. 
In these recent cases, courts have taken care to explain the 
rationale behind the standard they have chosen to apply in the 
same-gender, co-worker, teacher-student, and student to stu-
198. Id. The Court went even further when it stated that "Courts, ... must bear in 
mind that schools are unlike the adult workplace and that children may regularly in· 
teract in a manner that would be unacceptable among adults." !d. 
199. 74 F.3d 1186 (11th Cir. 1996). 
200. See Doe v. Claiborne County, 103 F. 3d 495, 513, 515 (6th Cir. 1996); Kinman 
v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 94 F.3d 463, 467-69 (8th Cir. 1996); Seamons v. Snow, 84 
F.3d 1226, 1232-22 (lOth Cir. 1996). 
201. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. ofEduc., 120 F.3d 1390 (11th Cir. 1997). 
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dent sexual harassment cases. Unfortunately, the standard 
chosen by these courts is not the standard that the majority of 
lower courts have applied. Moreover, the new standard makes 
it even easier for courts to protect the resources of school dis-
tricts at the expense of student victims of sexual harassment. 
While this has always been true, the Davis Court has pains-
takingly presented its reasons for selecting the Title VI stan-
dard for determining school district liability for student to stu-
dent sexual harassment. 
Very few students have ever been successful in sexual har-
assment cases. Frequently, the explanation offered by courts to 
justify a holding of no school district liability seems contrived 
and contrary to the evidence offered. Parents expect their chil-
dren to be safe from abuse when they send their children to 
school. When a child is sexually harassed by other students, 
parents expect school officials to know about the abuse and to 
take the necessary steps to stop the abuse. Under the existing 
standards of liability, it is unlikely that students will be able to 
prove that school district officials knew of the harassment be-
cause it is not clear which school officials must know in order to 
establish the requisite notice of discriminatory conduct. Even if 
the proper notice is established, courts have concluded that 
whatever action school officials take is sufficient to overcome 
the deliberate indifference requirement in virtually every in-
stance, even where the abuse is not stopped. The future direc-
tion of student sexual harassment case law is uncertain at best. 
But even though post-Davis courts will apply the new, stricter 
approach to school district liability, it will be beneficial to fi-
nally know what the accepted standard of liability is in this 
evolving area of law. 
